Crisis in Poland 1980. Martial law in Poland

In the mid-70s, an economic recession began, coinciding with the aggravation of the problem of external debt, in terms of which Poland was ahead of all socialist countries. This led to a severe financial and economic crisis in Poland in the 1980s. There were food difficulties. Rumors of government corruption were circulating that affected Edward Gierek himself.

The national currency depreciated. Protest demonstrations were held in the country, led by the Solidarity movement. The leaders of industrial enterprises and local authorities began to simply wait, waiting for developments. Meanwhile, the country's economy was collapsing. Products to the population were now sold by cards. General Wojciech Jaruzelski was forced in December 1981 to introduce martial law in the country, which lasted until July 1983.

The economic situation forced the government to further liberalize the country, which in turn led to further price increases. Inflation reached by 1982 - more than 100%, after which the price increase decreased to 15% per year and this situation lasted until 1985. However, macroeconomic problems soon arose again. A new denomination of the largest denomination was introduced: 5000 złoty in 1982. In the mid-1980s, there was some stabilization. And in the late 1980s, there were: 10,000 zlotys in 1988, 20,000 and 50,000 in 1989, 100,000, 200,000 and 500,000 in 1990. And finally, one million and two million zlotys in 1991 and 1992. Small coins, starting from 1 penny to 50 pennies, were no longer used in trade. Most coins in the late 1980s, other than commemorative coins, were made from aluminium.

When Poland switched to a market economy, it was a country in which 18% of GDP was produced by the private sector of the economy (including cooperatives - 28%). The cooperatives were not the same as in the USSR during the period of perestroika, but much more stable, had already existed for many years and had real experience of working, albeit in preferential, but still market conditions. At that time, about a quarter of the country's economy was completely market-oriented and was ready for reforms in the economy. The Polish economist J. Rostovsky recalled that in the 80s of the last century, about 35-45% of the income of the Poles began to come from income received from private economic activity.

At the end of the 1980s, the country's budget did not allow for an increase in pensions and wages for civil servants, and they remained at a low level. The main part of the budget revenues went to service the huge external debt, which during the 1980s increased by about two times, exceeding a total of $41 billion. And this is not counting the debt of 5.6 billion transferable rubles to the USSR.

As a result, the Rakovsky government allowed at the end of 1988 the "transfer into private hands" of state-owned enterprises. And those who participated in this received all sorts of benefits, and as a result, literally in a year (before the start of the post-communist stage of reforms), the number of joint-stock companies in the country increased dramatically. The new private sector soon played an important role in boosting the country's economic development. The communist elite was losing its political illusions and was forced to take a realistic look at the current situation in the country. The communists did not have the strength to save the economy from collapse, and this made them politically unviable.

Poland emerged from the crisis by taking the following measures:

Price liberalization;

State permission for access of individuals to all spheres of economic activity (January 1989 - January 1990);

The introduction of new budgetary restrictions on state-owned enterprises and the reduction of inflation rates to the level of a normal economy with the help of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as attracting new revenues to the budget (January 1990);

Measures to increase the convertibility of the national currency in current transactions and the removal of controls on foreign trade (January 1990).

The result of liberalization was that during 1990 prices rose by 585.5%.

The new economic policy had an impact on Poland's inflation dynamics. Despite the fact that Polish inflation was much lower than inflation in Russia, by the standards of developed countries, the advanced countries of Central Europe and Eastern Europe, price increases during this period were very high. If in 1991 real inflation in the country was 70%, in 1992 inflation was 40%. Since 1993, the inflation rate has become stable, which leading economists consider relatively acceptable for the economy and supporting a normal investment process - less than 40% per year. As a result of this policy, after a couple of years, prices for goods and services reached an acceptable level for the population.

With the growth of business confidence in the financial stability of the country, he ensured an influx of foreign investment. The fall of the zloty already in 1992 was replaced by a steady growth of the national currency, and since 1995 the annual inflow of investments into the country began to be measured in double digits.

Federal Agency for Education

State educational institution of higher professional education


Department of National History


USSR and the Polish crisis of 1980-1981.


Samara 2011


Introduction

Chapter 1. The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981

Chapter 2. Attitude of the USSR to the Polish events of 1980-1981

Conclusion

List of used literature


Introduction


“Our homeland was over the abyss. The achievements of many generations and the house restored from the ashes turn into ruins. State structures cease to function. The fading economy is being hit every day. Living conditions are a heavy burden on the shoulders of people. Painful dividing lines run through every enterprise, through many Polish families. The atmosphere of incessant conflicts, misunderstandings, hatred brings psychological devastation. Strikes, strike readiness, protests have become the norm…”

These words were uttered over the Warsaw radio on the morning of December 13, 1981 by the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR, General W. Jaruzelski, in his address to the Polish people in connection with the introduction of martial law in the country.

It became necessary in connection with the growing crisis in Polish society by the early 1980s. Due to unresolved problems in the economic life of Poland, a mass labor movement began, which, along with economic demands, began to put forward political ones. An independent self-governing trade union "Solidarity" was formed.

Socialism in Poland was established in 1945 as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Taking advantage of the presence of the Soviet Army, the left-wing parties took power and began to introduce the principles of a socialist economy and a Soviet-type political system. The Soviet leadership proclaimed the principles of strengthening fraternal friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, as well as the indisputable right to independent and independent development. In fact, this rhetoric did not work: the leadership of the USSR, by any means, up to the direct use of force, tried to maintain a paternalistic system of relations with other socialist countries.

As a result, the position of the USSR in relation to the Polish crisis of 1980-1981 is interesting. This issue will be considered in the present work.

To achieve this goal, we have set the following tasks:

Consider the events in Poland in 1980-1981.

Analyze the change in the attitude of the USSR to the Polish crisis.

The chronological framework of the work is spelled out in the very title of the topic. To be specific, this is: the summer of 1980, when strikes began at Polish factories and enterprises, to December 1981, when martial law was introduced.

When writing the first chapter, the following scientific works were used:

) Loiko L.V. Strength test: about-in floor-owls. friendship: formation, development.

) Tymovsky M., Kenevich Ya., Holzer E. History of Poland.

The first book is notable for the fact that the author, using rich factual material, recreates in detail the picture of the events taking place in Poland in the 1980s. The big disadvantage is the subjective interpretation of these events, since the main motive of the work is to show the history of Poland in the context of strengthening the friendship of the Soviet and Polish peoples (the author introduces us to the activities of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society).

The second work, in our opinion, is more objective. Famous Polish historians have described the history of Poland from the 10th century to the present day. We are interested in it, because it describes in detail the crisis of 1980-1981. The authors were able to overcome stereotypes and took a step towards building qualitatively new Polish-Russian relations based on deep knowledge and feelings of mutual respect.

When writing a chapter on the attitude of the USSR to the crisis of 1980-1981. the following works were used:

Immersion in a quagmire: (Anatomy of stagnation) / Comp. and general ed. T.A. Notkina.

In this paper, it is precisely the position of the Soviet leadership regarding the Polish events that is considered.

Lavrenov S.Ya. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts / S.Ya. Lavrenov, I.M. Popov.

The reference book “Poland. Questions and answers". The emphasis there is mainly on the economic and spiritual spheres of life in Polish society. In the article by Losoto O. and Tretyakov M. “Lech Walesa. Political Portrait” (Echo of the Planet, 1989. No. 22), citing interesting facts from the biography of this prominent political figure, the authors try to answer the question: why exactly did L. Walesa head the Solidarity trade union.


Chapter 1. The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981


In the summer of 1980, external and internal difficulties compelled the PPR government to carry out a long overdue increase in prices for meat and other foodstuffs. From the experience of previous years, it was well known how painfully the Polish public reacted to a sudden increase in prices. It was precisely such government acts that were the formal pretext for an explosion of discontent in labor collectives in 1970 and 1976. However, the new price increase, carried out on July 1, 1980, was carried out by the old methods, without preliminary preparation of public opinion. On the same day, the first strikes took place at the Ursus factory in Warsaw and the Autosan factory in Sanok. Unrest began at other enterprises.

At first, the demands were mainly economic: the abolition of price increases or compensation for price increases in wages. In most cases, the authorities satisfied the claims of labor collectives, but the increase in wages at some enterprises caused a chain reaction, strikes began at others. Soon, the amounts allocated by the government to raise wages far exceeded the savings in the budget, which they expected to receive from the increase in food prices.

The absence of a clear concept for overcoming economic difficulties, the unwillingness of the party and state leadership to enter into an open and honest dialogue with the working class, adherence to bureaucratic methods of management, fear of any changes - all this did not allow the government to successfully resolve the social conflict. The social and political situation in Poland that developed in July - the first half of August 1980 was exceptionally favorable for anti-government activities.

And the propaganda and organizational potential of the political opposition, created in advance, began to work. Already in July, strikes at Lublin enterprises, according to a well-defined plan, were increasingly acquiring a political character.

On the night of August 16-17 at the shipyard. Lenin, the Interfactory Strike Committee was created, which made unprecedented criticism of the Polish authorities. The first secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, E. Gierek, spoke on television and admitted mistakes in socio-economic policy, promised reforms and called on the strikers to return to work. His speech did not have the expected effect.

Having created the Interfactory Strike Committee at the Gdansk shipyard, the Korovtsy took control of events in their own hands. In order to implement their long-planned plans for the formation of a legal opposition organization, members of the KOR inspired the discontented workers with the idea of ​​the need to establish new trade unions, "independent and self-governing", which could become the "guarantor" of their rights. In the socio-economic sphere, the cow's advisers imposed the most demagogic, unrealistic demands on the workers. At the same time, of course, it was not the interests of the working class that were meant, but the further aggravation of the situation in the country.

After the signing on August 31, 1980, of an agreement between the government commission and the strike committee in Gdansk, the ideological and political struggle in Poland intensified. A new structure emerged in the political system of the state: "independent and self-governing" trade unions "Solidarity".

The right to lead the strike in Gdansk, and subsequently Solidarity, was given to 37-year-old electrician Lech Walesa. He was born into a poor peasant family, where in addition to him there were 6 more children. Walesa's parents died early. He studied at school, an agricultural technical school, served in the army and went to work as an electrician at the shipyard. V. I. Lenin in Gdansk. Soon Lech got married; now he and his wife Danuta have 8 children. Like most Poles, Walesa is a very religious person. At his insistence, every meeting of Solidarity begins with a divine service. When the strike movement swept the country on August 14, 1980, Lech Walesa jumped over the fence surrounding the Gdansk shipyard and joined the strikers.

Attention is drawn to the rapid quantitative growth of Solidarity: during September 1980 - February 1981, 7-8 million people joined its ranks. Apparently, two factors had an effect: deep unrest among the Polish working people, the urgent need for changes in social policy, and, on the other hand, the long preparatory work of the political opposition. In all this, there was also a certain emotional outburst of millions of Poles who believed the slogans and promises of the leaders of Solidarity and supported them with the same enthusiasm with which they supported the call of E. Gierek in the early 70s to “build a second Poland”.

Using "Solidarity" as its legal cover, the anti-socialist opposition waged a fierce struggle against the leading role of the PZPR in society, the socialist system and the Polish-Soviet friendship. With the help of political and economic demands, organization of strikes and poster war, she sought to disorganize the work of the state apparatus, undermine the legal and moral and political foundations of society, cause economic chaos in the country and exacerbate the material difficulties of the population.

"Solidarity" organized strikes almost daily in a checkerboard pattern in all provinces of the country. In January 1981, for example, breaks in work were provoked at almost 2,000 enterprises, and 1.7 million people were thus drawn into labor and socio-political conflicts.

The increase in wages for workers and employees, carried out under the pressure of Solidarity, with a simultaneous drop in labor productivity and a reduction in working hours, caused progressive inflation. Between September and December 1980, average wages rose by 12 percent, and average monthly industrial output fell. In May 1981, the decline in industrial production had already exceeded 18 percent, and wages had increased by almost a quarter compared with May of the previous year. Every day, up to one and a half billion zlotys were paid out of the wage funds of enterprises and institutions, which had no commodity equivalent on the domestic market.

The leadership of the PUWP, the government bodies that took a course towards the renewal of the country, were placed in extremely difficult conditions. It was practically impossible to carry out rehabilitation under strike pressure, in the conditions of a “pistol to the temple”. The opposition, on the other hand, accused the authorities of helplessness in matters of economic management, unwillingness to observe the interests of the working people.

The PZPR faced internal difficulties. Many members of the party joined Solidarity, and in some centers so-called "horizontal structures" arose, uniting party organizations that advocated reforms. On the other hand, the communist bloc states put pressure on the Polish leaders, insisting on more vigorous action against Solidarity. On December 5, a meeting of the heads of these states took place, which was preceded by a concentration of troops near the borders of Poland. However, Moscow feared the possible consequences of an armed invasion of Poland and postponed the adoption of a final decision.

In late 1980 - early 1981, the leaders of Solidarity increasingly felt confident in their abilities. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered for demonstrations, in some regions there were strikes and protests against abuses and violations of the law by local authorities. Following the example of the workers, the peasants organized a protest action in Rzeszow, and students in August 1981 in Lodz and a number of other cities organized "hunger marches" under the slogan "The government seeks to starve the people." Around Solidarity, which was formally just a trade union, opposition to the communist system was grouped.

On February 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski was appointed to the post of Prime Minister. The prime minister in uniform was supposed to symbolize decisiveness and firmness. Mieczysław Rakovsky, editor of the newspaper Politika, who was considered a party liberal, became vice-premier. The government promised to carry out economic reform - limiting centralization in economic management and introducing elements of cost accounting, and also agreed to the creation of an organizing committee of the Independent Union of Farmers and the registration of the Independent Association of Students.

In the spring and summer of 1981, the communist authorities and Solidarity were in a state of unstable equilibrium. In early March, after the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet leadership met in Moscow with the Polish delegation and demanded the introduction of martial law. Over the following weeks, the authorities began to tighten their policy, and on March 19, during the exercises of the Warsaw Pact troops that began in Poland, the police beat several Solidarity figures in the city of Bydgoszcz. The union threatened a general strike, but its leaders tried to prevent it, fearing outside interference. At the end of March, at a meeting of the PUWP Central Committee, they also decided to compromise, promising to investigate the Bydgoszcz incident.

The mood in the country was affected by the difficult economic situation. The food supply system was completely disrupted. Economic difficulties could be overcome only with the help of measures that were painful for society, but for this the authorities needed its support. The allies under the Warsaw Pact, especially the Soviet leadership, were opposed to the introduction of elements of a market economy. However, deep anxiety and grief moderated public excitement for some time - on May 13, an attempt was made on the life of Pope John Paul II in Rome, and on May 28, Cardinal Vyshinsky, who enjoyed great authority, Primate of Poland, died.

In June, the authorities took a tougher stance. There was a self-organization of extremely conservative groups that put forward anti-German and anti-Semitic slogans. On June 6, 1981, the Polish leadership received a letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU, which expressed concern about the state of affairs in Poland, gave an impartial assessment of the current socio-political situation in Polish society and the party, and also set out recommendations for stabilizing the situation in the country. The leadership of Solidarity tried to cool the passions, while the party launched a counteroffensive. On July 14, the PUWP congress began, at which a promise was made to deal with the "horizontal structures." Promises of reforms, including economic reforms, were vague. After the party congress, the Solidarity leadership was no longer able to prevent protests related to the almost complete cessation of the food supply to cities. In response, the authorities broke off negotiations with Solidarity. At the trade union congress that began on September 5, its leadership had difficulty curbing the radicals. The congress adopted the "Appeal to the working people of Eastern Europe" - so for the first time "Solidarity" was involved in the problems of foreign policy.

Beginning in the autumn, the communists waged a systematic offensive. Secret preparations for the introduction of martial law accelerated. The indecisive Kanya, under pressure from Moscow, resigned, and on October 18, Jaruzelsky, who continued to be prime minister and minister of national defense, became the first secretary of the PUWP Central Committee. The "horizontal structures" were destroyed. Various provocations from the authorities multiplied. Solidarity became polarized: on the one hand, there was a radicalization of some of its leaders, on the other, there was fatigue and disappointment among the broad masses of ordinary members. The situation sharply worsened at the end of November. Jaruzelski was waiting for the right moment to decide on the introduction of martial law. Scheduled for December 11-12, the meeting of the All-Polish Solidarity Commission in Gdansk made it possible to intern the entire leadership of the trade union with one blow.

Since August 1980, the authorities in both Moscow and Warsaw viewed the existence of an independent organization as something contrary to the very essence of the system. Now there is an opportunity to eliminate it. On the night of December 12-13, martial law was introduced. Supreme power passed to the Military Council of National Salvation, headed by Jaruzelski. This council was subordinated to the military commissars, who acted in all voivodeships, cities, enterprises and institutions. A military order was announced to control a large part of the economy. The activities of trade unions and many other organizations, the press (except for party and war newspapers) and schools have been suspended, telephone communications have been turned off, and it is forbidden to leave the place of residence without special permission. Strikes, demonstrations, meetings were forbidden.

The police occupied all the premises of Solidarity. About five thousand people were interned - mainly Solidarity figures, but also opposition intellectuals and members of the PUWP operating in "horizontal structures". Probably, the authorities expected that, having lost contact with advisers, Walesa would succumb to persuasion, make a statement recognizing martial law and make an appeal to society. When he refused, he was also interned. The enterprises carried out a purge among the workers, dismissing the members of Solidarity.

The imposition of martial law was relatively easy. Solidarity was taken by surprise; in addition, those of its leaders who escaped internment, as well as representatives of the church, issued calls to remain calm. Although Solidarity was dissolved, it continued to operate actively in illegal conditions, remaining one of the most influential social movements in the country.

It was assumed that the response to the actions of the authorities would be a general strike. However, strikes took place only at some large enterprises. They were suppressed within a few days by the actions of special police detachments, operating with the support of tanks and helicopters. Only in Upper Silesia was the resistance of the striking miners and metallurgists more decisive. On December 15, during the assault on the Buek mine, nine miners were killed; the last occupation strike at the Piast mine in Tychy ended on 28 December. The initiators and most active participants in the strikes were arrested. During the entire period of martial law, the total number of arrests reached approximately four thousand. Approximately one and a half a dozen people died in the suppression of strikes and dispersal of demonstrations.


Chapter 2. Attitude of the USSR to the Polish events of 1980-1981

polish worker strike soviet

In 1944-1945. Poland was liberated from the fascist invaders by the Soviet Army. Under pressure from the USSR, the Polish United Workers' Party came to power here. And like some other Eastern European countries, Poland became a communist state.

The idea that it is necessary to respect the sovereignty and independence of the socialist countries, to take into account the peculiarities of their positions on certain issues, their specific policies, was repeatedly emphasized in the speeches of L.I. Brezhnev and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

But this was only a theory, and practice turned out to be different. It was aimed at preserving the paternalistic system of relations between the USSR and other socialist countries created under Stalin. Brezhnev and his entourage, as well as Khrushchev before that, were extremely suspicious and hostile to any attempts at fundamental changes that, in the view of the Soviet leadership, could mean an attempt on the administrative-command bureaucratic system that existed in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. and hostile.

Meanwhile, the crisis processes in the etacratic states deepened and grew. But the Soviet leadership did not consider it possible to take a realistic look at the state of affairs and, together with their allies, somehow neutralize them. When the socio-economic and socio-political crisis in Poland turned into an open conflict between the authorities and the people, the Soviet leadership did not understand its underlying causes or pretended that it did not understand them. The Soviet mass media reduced the Polish crisis itself mainly to the fact that it was the result of imperialist interference in the affairs of Poland, the activities of Western intelligence services and representatives of anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary forces in their service. Almost all organizations that opposed the policies of the party-state elite were included in this category, although many of them, especially Solidarity, were supported by the broadest masses of the working class and other sections of Polish society. Giving their interpretation of the events related to the crisis in Poland that began in the summer of 1980, the Soviet mass media differed significantly in their assessments of these events by the PUWP and its leadership, and these assessments were not always brought to the attention of the Soviet public. So, in Soviet newspapers, only in the presentation, and not in full, the program speeches of the leaders of the PUWP and Poland, the materials of the plenums of the Central Committee of the PUWP, the IX Extraordinary Party Congress, held in July 1981, were published. Meanwhile, in the materials of the congress, a detailed analysis of the reasons that led to crisis, and measures were outlined that, as the then leaders of the country hoped, should lead to the normalization of the situation in the country.

In the report of the Central Committee of the PUWP to the 9th Party Congress, in particular, it was noted that the crisis in the summer of 1980 was connected with the action of the workers not against socialism, but against the violation of its principles, not against the people's power, but against the wrong methods of government, not against the party, but against the mistakes in the policy of its leadership.

The scale and depth of the crisis stemmed from many erroneous concepts and decisions in economic and social policy in the 1970s. In the report, among such mistakes, first of all, the excessive orientation of the then Polish leadership headed by E. Gierek to the development of economic, scientific and technical ties with the West, to obtaining loans for the modernization of production and the construction of new enterprises, whose products are sold in Western markets, Poland hoped to pay for the loans received. However, this did not happen. Credits were used inefficiently: they were mainly spent in the sphere of consumption.

The efficiency of the economy was reduced due to mismanagement and squandering of the means of production and labor, low quality products, lack of interest of labor collectives in results of their work. The principles of social justice and elementary moral norms were violated. There has been an unreasonable rise in income disparities. The insufficient development of health care, public transport, and school education was painfully perceived by people with low earnings and large families.

As emphasized in the congress documents, another cause of the crisis was the departure in political practice from the main principles of socialism, the principle of social justice, the restriction of the content and forms of democracy, the perversion of the principles of democratic centralism and Leninist norms in party work. Incorrect criteria and an unfair distribution of the goods produced contributed to the emergence of privileged strata and pressure groups that influenced the mechanism for exercising power. This led to a perversion of the leading role of the party and the way in which state power functions.

A common feature of all crises in Poland, including the crisis of 1980-1981, despite their specificity and originality, as noted in the documents of the congress, was that they always gave the same result - an economic crisis and social conflict. The consequence of this situation was the distrust of the people and the masses of the party to the leadership of the party and the country. Distrust spread to the entire party, which was identified with the policy of the leadership. Those values ​​and achievements that in the minds of every person were associated with socialism: justice, equality, confidence in the future, universal access to culture and education, public concern for children, the elderly, lonely and sick people, health and environmental protection - turned out to be in the second half of the 70s under threat. The promised increase in prosperity did not happen either. Instead, there is an economic crisis, inflation, growing uncertainty about the future. The burden of the crisis was especially felt by the younger generation, deprived of the prospects for normal participation in the life of society, in the material, social and socio-political spheres.

The above main provisions of the analysis of the crisis situation by the IX Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP could not but have an impact on the position of the Soviet leadership. Certain corrections were made to the initial interpretation of the events as the result of the intrigues of imperialism and internal reaction. In the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Party Congress, which was made by L.I. Brezhnev, it was said in connection with the Polish events that where "errors and miscalculations in domestic policy are added to the subversive activities of imperialism, there is a ground for the activation of elements hostile to socialism." At the same time, the report stated that "we will not leave socialist Poland, fraternal Poland, in trouble and will not let us be offended." Thus, in essence, the doctrine put forward during the Czechoslovak events of 1968 on the collective “defence of the gains of socialism”, that is, was confirmed. the right of Poland's allies under the Warsaw Pact to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and dictate to the Polish leadership such a line of conduct that the then Soviet leaders considered necessary for the cause of socialism in Poland: a line of resolutely rebuffing the forces of internal counter-revolution, to strengthening the leading role of the PZPR in the life of Polish society, strengthening positions of the administrative-command system, and by no means a line towards political and economic reforms, the democratization of society, the establishment of the principles of social justice in it, which was demanded by the broad masses of communists and working people of the country.

After the 26th Congress of the CPSU, political pressure on the Polish leadership to induce it to pursue a line pleasing to Moscow intensified. In April 1981, a Soviet party and government delegation headed by M.A. went to Warsaw to meet with the leaders of the PUWP. Suslov. On June 5, 1981, the Central Committee of the CPSU sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. It was a closed document. But it was published by the Polish press. Therefore, the Soviet press was also forced to place it on its pages. On June 12, 1981, the text of the letter appeared on the pages of Pravda. The letter said that not only was the situation in Poland dangerous, but it had brought the country to a critical point.

The letter contained reproaches against the PUWP and its leadership, said that the party was not taking effective measures to combat the counter-revolutionary threat, that in the party itself, random people who openly propagated opportunist views often came to the leadership of local organizations, and experienced and devoted the cause of the party workers with an unsullied reputation.

Finally, the letter emphasized that the offensive of the hostile anti-socialist forces in Poland threatened the interests of the entire socialist community, its cohesion, integrity, security of borders, and that under these conditions it was necessary to prevent the worst, avert a national catastrophe, mobilize all forces to repel the class enemy, to fight against counter-revolution. This requires the revolutionary determination of the Party, its activists, its leadership. The Party can and must find the strength within itself to turn the tide of events ... to direct them in the right direction.

The letter of the CPSU did not contain a threat of a repetition of the Czechoslovak version of 1968, but it was not ruled out that such an option was possible if the Polish leadership remained inactive.

The exceptional complexity of the internal situation in Poland, the sharp aggravation of socio-economic problems in the country, the deterioration in the supply of the population, rising prices, inflation, strikes, the activities of extremist forces striving for power, active interference in the affairs of Poland by the Western powers and their special services, which encouraged extremist forces on the intensification of the confrontation with the party and the state, and finally, the pressure of the Soviet leadership on Poland - all this forced the then First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR V. Jaruzelsky to decide on the introduction of martial law in the country, the creation of the Military Council of National Salvation, the internment of the leaders of Solidarity ”and former members of the Polish leadership, removed from power after the onset of the crisis, the prohibition of trade unions, strikes, the closure of a number of publications, etc. As V. Jaruzelsky noted, the decision to introduce martial law "was the most dramatic decision in my life, it sits in me like a splinter, and will sit as long as I'm alive."

Different assessments are given to what happened in those days. Some believe that the introduction of martial law was a forced step, that in conditions when the country was on the brink of an abyss, only martial law could save it from a national catastrophe, civil war, external military intervention, which could be avoided in only one way: to show that the Polish leadership itself can defend socialism and its gains. Others believe that the introduction of martial law was a tragic mistake, it threw Poland back, aggravated the crisis in the country, and did not solve the problems that emerged during the crisis. The leadership of the party and the state won tactically by introducing a military position, thereby extending his tenure in power by almost a decade. But it lost strategically, interrupting the process of reforms, and then carrying out them cautiously, half-heartedly, belatedly, which ultimately led to the discrediting of the PZPR, the public's conviction that the ruling party, the state apparatus led by it, was not able to effectively govern the country. All this ultimately led to the defeat of the PUWP in the elections in the summer of 1989, as a result of which the party first ceased to be the ruling party, and then ceased to exist altogether. It was replaced in January 1990 by the social democracy of the Polish Republic. Of course, in such a sad turn of events for the PUWP, the party itself, its leaders and the policy pursued by them are primarily to blame. But it was carried out in an extremely unfavorable external environment for the PUWP and its reformist wing.

Thus, it should be noted that the Soviet leadership underestimated or did not want to correctly assess the events in Poland in 1980-1981. They tried to reduce the causes of the crisis to imperialist interference in the affairs of Poland, the activities of the Western secret services and representatives of the anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary forces in their service. In fact, the scale and depth of the crisis consisted of many erroneous concepts and decisions in the field of economic and social policy in the 70s.

Subsequently, realizing the seriousness of the Polish events, the Soviet leadership realized that the "offensive of hostile anti-socialist forces in Poland" threatened the interests of the entire socialist community, its cohesion, integrity, border security, and that under these conditions it was necessary to take appropriate measures. But the leadership of the USSR decided not to use force, since the introduction of troops into the territory of Poland could lead to unpredictable consequences. The only solution left was the introduction of martial law, which was done.


Conclusion


In the summer of 1980 Poland's economic situation began to deteriorate; the huge debt to Western banks, caused by the large number of loans made in the 70s, contributes to further complications. All this causes growing dissatisfaction of the working class, but the signals coming from the primary party organizations are ignored. In July and August there are unrest of an economic nature at numerous enterprises. The authorities adopt a principle that contradicts elementary economic laws: the teams of enterprises interrupting work receive a significant increase in wages. This causes a chain reaction - strikes are threatened by all new enterprises.

Thus, mass demonstrations of the workers begin in August, and their demands expand from economic to social and political. Here the new trade union Solidarity enters the arena, headed by Lech Walesa.

Meanwhile, the international position of the country was deteriorating. L.I. Brezhnev uttered a threatening phrase: "We will not leave fraternal Poland in trouble and will not let it be offended." However, the USSR did not dare to launch a military operation.

In January 1981, tensions in Polish society increased. Prices soared wildly, the remnants of goods disappeared from the store shelves. Hunger marches took place in various districts. The Communists tried to save the situation by electing a new energetic leader of the party - General V. Jaruzelsky. But on November 28, a general strike began. Then Jaruzelski, as head of the Council of Ministers, on the night of December 12-13, introduced martial law and banned the activities of Solidarity. But she continued her activities underground.

By the end of the 1980s, Solidarity would become legal. He will achieve impressive success in the parliamentary elections. As a result, the first government in the countries of the Eastern bloc, headed by an opponent of the communist system (T. Mazowiecki), will be created in Poland, although several key posts were nevertheless occupied by the communists. The compromise marked the beginning of fundamental changes in Poland, which were to lead to the creation of a democratic state.


List of used literature


1.Bronislavsky E., Vachnadze G.N. Polish dialogue. Events in Poland through the eyes of Polish, Soviet, American, British, West German and French journalists. - Tbilisi: Ganatleba, 1990.

2.Lavrenov S.Ya. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts / S.Ya. Lavrenov, I.M. Popov. - M.: LLC "AST Publishing House". 2003.

.Loiko L.V. Strength test: about-in floor-owls. friendship: formation, development. - Minsk: Belarus, 1989.

.Losoto O., Tretyakov M. Lech Walesa. Political portrait // Echo of the planet. - 1989. - No. 22.

.Immersion in a quagmire: (Anatomy of stagnation) / Comp. and general ed. T.A. Notkina. - M.: Progress, 1991.

.Poland. Questions and Answers: Handbook / Common. ed. and comp. V.A. Svetlov. - M.: Politizdat, 1991.

.Tymovsky M., Kenevich Ya., Holzer E. History of Poland. - M .: Publishing house "Ves Mir", 2004.


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". Estimates of the events of that era vary greatly both in Poland itself and abroad. During martial law, repressions took place in the country: as a result of clashes with the police, more than 30 people. died. But in general, the scale of repression, as well as the reaction of the opposition itself during this period, were moderate and even somewhat muted, given the brewing consumer crisis in the country. The Catholic Church of Poland played a key role in preventing the escalation of the conflict on both sides.

Operation start

Pro-Western ferment in the Polish trade union environment began to be felt more and more acutely, especially in the context of the impending consumer crisis. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, at that time the 1st secretary of the PUWP, head of government and minister of defense, understood that the main destabilizing threat came from the Solidarity organization, which enjoyed the support of the population. On the morning of December 12, 1981, Wojciech Jaruzelski called the leadership of the USSR and said the following: “... on the night of December 12-13 of this year. Martial law will be introduced throughout the entire territory of Poland. I take full responsibility for this step…”

On the night of December 12-13, 1981, telephone communications were cut off throughout Poland. As a result, the leaders of the oppositional anti-communist movement "Solidarity" were instantly isolated. Tanks and armored personnel carriers appeared on the streets. A statement by General Jaruzelski was broadcast on television that "the hands of the adventurers must be tied before they push the Fatherland into the abyss of fratricidal war." The general also announced the formation of the National Salvation Military Council ( English).

Causes

results

As a result of this military action, the local trade union committees of Solidarity were significantly weakened, and many leaders were simply intimidated. But in general, Solidarity continued to operate under the leadership of Lech Walesa, who temporarily chose a policy of non-resistance, well known to the Poles since the partition of the country. A striking manifestation of the ongoing underground activity even at this time was the systematic publication of periodicals, leaflets and bulletins. The publishers were secretly supported by the Catholic Church, which maintained a strong position in Polish society.

On July 17, 1986, the government of Poland adopted an amnesty law; in the period up to February 21, 1987, 1,200 participants in anti-government protests took advantage of it (of which 225 were serving sentences in prisons).

US economic sanctions against Poland

Immediately after the introduction of martial law, the US government imposed economic sanctions on Poland and the USSR. The following year, 1982, Poland was stripped of its most-favoured-nation trade status and its application to join the International Monetary Fund was blocked. The amnesty of 1984 opened the door to the normalization of economic relations between the two countries. On February 20, 1987, President Reagan announced the lifting of the remaining sanctions and the restoration of normal trade.

The sanctions had a negative impact on the Polish economy (the Polish government claimed that they cost the Polish economy $15 billion between 1981-1985). The losses were partially offset by Soviet loans, which totaled 3.4 million [ clarify] dollars, and an increase in the supply of raw materials and energy.

Contemporary estimates

In 2005-2008 They tried to bring Jaruzelski to court for imposing a dictatorship.

Notes

Literature

  • Lavrenov S.A., Popov I.M. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts. - M .: Astrel, 2003. - S. 391-409. - ISBN 5-271-05709-7

Birth of Solidarity

The party and state leadership turned out to be powerless in the face of the inexorably impending socio-political and economic crisis. The replacement of P. Yaroshevich, unpopular in society, by E. Babyukh, as head of government, did not help. In the summer of 1980, in response to rising food prices in Poland, a strike wave began to rise, at first under economic slogans. It reached its peak in August, when the enterprises of Gdansk, Szczecin, and Silesia went on strike. The strikes were of an occupational nature, there were no street manifestations in order to exclude possible provocations from the authorities.

The government was forced to sign agreements with the strike committees, which provided not only the satisfaction of the economic demands of the workers, but also their right to create trade unions independent of the administration, release political prisoners, and refuse to persecute advisers and experts of strikers from among members of opposition organizations.

The first reaction of the PUWP to the next crisis was traditional: there was a change in the party and state leadership. S. Kanya was elected the first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Yu. Penkovsky became the prime minister. But these personnel changes did not have a noticeable effect on public sentiment. The initiative passed into the hands of the opposition.

In November 1980, the independent self-governing trade union Solidarity was officially registered. By the end of 1980, it had about 8 million members. In 1981, the trade union of individual peasants "Rural Solidarity" was created. Other trade union centers (Central Council of Trade Unions, autonomous trade unions) were significantly inferior to him in terms of numbers. "Solidarity" was an association of autonomous organizations of individual regions. Its actions were coordinated by the All-Polish Conciliation Commission, headed by the chairman of the Gdansk inter-factory strike committee, an electrician from the shipyard named after. Lenin L. Walesoy. Well-known opposition figures B. Geremek, J. Kuron, T. Mazowiecki, A. Michnik, J. Olszewski and others provided great assistance in its activities.

"Solidarity" from the very beginning was predominantly a socio-political, and not a trade union movement, uniting diverse forces. It grew up on a wave of labor protest, and at first did not have clear plans for the further development of the country. Fear of Soviet intervention forced the intellectual headquarters of the movement to come up with the concept of a "self-regulating revolution." It provided that Poland, while remaining a member of the Soviet military-political bloc, should simultaneously strive for an internal transformation of the socio-political system: political pluralism, the establishment of public control over the activities of the state, ensuring the independence of public and state institutions from the PUWP.

The political claims of "Solidarity" and opposition to them from the party-state leadership of the country gave rise to constant, increasingly acute conflicts. The situation could have been defuse by a mutual compromise, but neither side had the will to do so. This became evident after the IX Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP and the 1st Congress of Solidarity in 1981. Each of the parties self-determined as the only guarantor of the development of the renewal process in Poland. The Polish leaders were under strong pressure from the USSR and some other states of the socialist community, who demanded that more decisive measures be taken against Solidarity.

In 1981 there was a concentration of power in the party-state leadership of the PPR. General V. Jaruzelski was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers, elected First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee and retained the post of Minister of National Defense.

A sharp aggravation of the political confrontation took place in December 1981. The radical wing in the Solidarity leadership headed for an open confrontation with the government, threatening to hold a general strike. There was a danger of an uncontrolled development of the conflict with the escalation into a civil war and the intervention of the allies under the Warsaw Pact. Under these conditions, the State Council introduced martial law in the country on December 13, 1981. The activities of all political parties, public organizations and trade unions were suspended, over 5 thousand leading figures of Solidarity at all levels were interned. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Military Council of National Salvation, headed by V. Jaruzelsky. In order to avoid a general strike, all key industries, ports and 129 large enterprises were transferred to a military mode of operation. During the introduction of martial law, 8 people died.

Martial law temporarily weakened the sharpness of the political confrontation. But it could not solve the economic problems of the country. The economic reform launched in 1982, in accordance with which the activities of enterprises were based on the principles of independence, self-government and self-financing, i.e. should have been carried out in conditions close to competitive, did not bring the expected results. The imposition of an embargo on economic relations with Poland by the West also prevented overcoming the crisis. Foreign debt continued to grow, prices in the domestic market rose.

Solidarity was weakened, but not crushed, and its structures at all levels were gradually resurrected underground. In April 1982, the Temporary Coordinating Commission of Solidarity was created. In October 1982, the Seimas decided to dissolve all trade unions and create new ones based on the sectoral principle. This meant that the hopes of the authorities that Solidarity would agree to their terms of compromise were not realized. A long-term struggle for the legalization of Solidarity began, during which various concepts of returning the movement to the arena of legal political life were tested.

All this time, Solidarity enjoyed the active support of the Catholic Church, whose authority in society continued to grow steadily, as well as the help of the West. In 1983, L. Walesa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Underground structures received significant financial and technical assistance through the foreign offices of Solidarity, Polish-language Western radio stations carried out a lot of information and propaganda work in its interests.

By 1988, the inability of the government to bring the country out of the crisis without a significant drop in the living standards of the population became obvious. In April 1988, there was a literal explosion of strikes, which came as a surprise not only to the authorities, but also to the opposition. The workers demanded higher wages and the legalization of Solidarity. Already in August this demand became the main one in all strikes.

The authorities were forced to enter into behind-the-scenes negotiations with a part of the Solidarity activists who had expressed their readiness for this, and from the end of August, preparations began for meetings of the “round table” between the authorities and the opposition. The idea of ​​a compromise ran into opposition from both the radical wing of Solidarity and part of the party-state leadership. Only in mid-January 1989, a group of party reformers, which included the first secretary of the PUWP Central Committee V. Jaruzelsky and Prime Minister M. Rakovsky, managed to pass a resolution on political and trade union pluralism at the plenum of the Central Committee. This paved the way for the legalization of Solidarity. The success of the reformers was facilitated by the ongoing “perestroika” in the USSR at that time.

The “Round Table” with the participation of representatives of Solidarity, the government, the PZPR, allied parties, the All-Polish Agreement of Trade Unions (UASP) - the trade union center of new trade unions, created after 1982 and the episcopate, took place from February 6 to April 5, 1989. Among its most important The results were decisions to hold early parliamentary elections, the introduction of the presidency, the creation of a second chamber in parliament - the Senate, as well as the division of mandates between various political forces in the Sejm.

From “Real Socialism” to a Western-Type Social Society

On April 17, 1989, Solidarity was re-registered. After the completion of the round table, the focus of attention of the PUWP, allied parties and the opposition was the preparation for the parliamentary elections. By agreement, 65% of the seats in the Sejm were assigned to the parties of the ruling coalition (including 37% of the PUWP), and 35% to the opposition. Elections to the Senate were free.

The two rounds of parliamentary elections held in June 1989 brought tremendous success to the opposition. She won almost all of her parliamentary candidates in the first round, and won 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate. On July 19, at a joint meeting of the Seimas and the Senate, V. Jaruzelski was elected president of the country. This became possible only because 11 deputies from the opposition did not participate in the vote. Having won formally, Jaruzelski suffered a moral defeat.

After the election of the president, a long search for a political formula for government began. Its composition was determined only on August 17. The opposition and former allies of the PUWP - the United Peasant and Democratic Parties - declared their readiness to enter it. T. Mazowiecki, a well-known figure in the movement of the Catholic intelligentsia and the opposition, became prime minister. For the first time in its history, the PUWP lost its usual role of the ruling party.

Starting from the second half of 1989, significant changes took place in the political life of Poland, many new parties appeared, and the existing ones underwent a profound transformation. In January 1990, the last, XI Congress of the PZPR took place, which decided on its self-dissolution. The successor of the PUWP was the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP).

The name of the state was changed - from the Polish People's Republic to the Republic of Poland, the crown was returned to the eagle on the state emblem.

To improve the economy, a stabilization plan (Balcerowicz plan) was adopted, which provided for the introduction of strict control over the financial sector, the reduction of state subsidies to enterprises, ensuring the internal convertibility of the zloty, as well as reducing employment and the emergence of unemployment (“shock therapy”). The plan received approval and financial support from the West. Its implementation made it possible to quickly stabilize the country's finances, saturate the domestic market with goods, and begin corporatization and privatization of enterprises. But it was not possible to stop the decline in industrial and agricultural production, and unemployment grew faster than expected, exceeding 2 million in early 1992.

In 1990, general presidential elections were held, in which L. Walesa won in the second round. In November 1991, free parliamentary elections were held, demonstrating a significant split in Polish society. Again, as in the early 1920s, the Seim was composed of numerous political factions. Absolute predominance was gained by right-wing and centrist parties and movements, which arose for the most part on the basis of the former Solidarity. Despite the common ancestry, these forces were in a state of fierce confrontation. Their interaction was hampered not only by programmatic and ideological differences, but also by the ambitions of the leaders. The left, led by the SDRP, although they were in the minority, demonstrated their viability, solidarity and the presence of a stable electorate. Not bad positions were also held by the center-left Polish People's Party (Peasant Party), which arose in the place of the OKP. The right-wing cabinet formed by Y. Olszewski turned out to be not very viable, it lasted a little more than half a year. After his resignation, the center-right government of H. Sukhotskaya was formed, which also did not have a reliable parliamentary majority behind it.

In 1993, President L. Walesa, using his constitutional powers, prematurely dissolved the parliament, which failed to approve the state budget within the prescribed time frame. Parliamentary elections were held on the basis of a new electoral law adopted by the Sejm shortly before its dissolution, which introduced a 5 percent electoral threshold.

The results of the 1993 elections turned out to be favorable for the left, which united in the Union of Democratic Left Forces, and the PSL, which received the majority of seats in the Sejm and the right to form the cabinet of ministers. At the same time, the president, in accordance with the so-called “small” constitution adopted by parliament in 1992, exercised his right to appoint power ministers and the minister of foreign affairs.

For two years, the coexistence of the left government continued (V. Pawlak (PSL) and the Social Democrat J. Oleksy were successively prime ministers) and President L. Walesa, who was oriented towards the right and center-right parties. This was a very important period for the strengthening of parliamentarism in Poland, the period of accumulation of experience in the interaction of various political forces in the name of the country's broadly understood interests.

In November 1995 presidential elections were held. According to the results of the second round, in which L. Walesa and SDLP leader A. Kwasniewski entered, the victory went to the left-wing candidate, who received the support of not only the traditional electorate, but also many young voters who entered conscious life already in the 90s. and free from the ideological likes and dislikes of the 80s. In the spring of 1997, the Parliament adopted a new constitution for the Republic of Poland, which establishes a parliamentary form of government.

The 1997 elections gave a relative majority of mandates to the right-wing forces, which managed to unite in the Electoral Action of Solidarity. As a result of the elections, a coalition government headed by J. Buzek was formed, which, in addition to the victorious bloc, included the centrist Union of Freedom. The period of coexistence of the leftist president with the right-centrist cabinet began.

In 1992-1993 positive shifts were noted in the economy, primarily in industry, which, after many years of decline, began to rise. This trend continued into the next five years. The rate of inflation has dropped significantly. But the social cost of transformation in the economy turned out to be significant, in 1996 unemployment still exceeded 2 million people. The dissatisfaction of the working people with their position is manifested in economic strikes, most often initiated in recent years by the largest trade union associations: the All-Polish Agreement of Trade Unions and Solidarity.

The recognition by the Western allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition of the Provisional Government of National Unity in 1945 and the refusal to support the government in exile contributed to Poland's rapid return to international politics. Poland received the right to sign the UN Charter as one of its founders, to take a seat in old and newly created international organizations. A distinctive feature of its foreign policy until the end of the 80s. there was a consistent focus on the Soviet Union. Many circumstances contributed to this to a large extent: close military-political interaction and ideological affinity of the new government in Poland with the USSR, the unspoken division of spheres of influence in Europe between the great powers, according to which Poland found itself in the zone of Moscow's predominant influence, and the analysis by the political leaders of the Slavic states of the sad experience international relations in the interwar period, their fear of the possibility of a repetition of German aggression, etc. The pro-Soviet orientation of Poland in matters of foreign policy was also dictated by the fact that it was precisely thanks to the active position of the USSR at the Potsdam Conference 1939 belonging to Germany: Lower Silesia, Opole Silesia, Lubusz land, Western Pomerania, part of East Prussia, as well as the free city of Danzig (Gdansk), i.e. all territories east of the Odra and Nysa Luzhytska rivers, including Szczecin and Swinoujscie. The final decision on the issue of territorial changes in Central Europe was to be taken by a peace conference on Germany, but it never took place. In 1953, the western border of Poland was secured by an agreement with the GDR, and in 1970 - with the FRG.

Serious tensions again arose in the determination of the border with Czechoslovakia in Cieszyn Silesia. Ultimately, not without pressure from the USSR, Warsaw agreed to the restoration of the status quo here, which existed before October 1938. The final contractual consolidation of this section of the border took place in 1958.

Poland actively participated in the formation of the people's democracy camp, which later became known as the socialist community. She was among the founders of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949, an economic grouping of the states of Central and South-Eastern Europe led by the USSR. In 1995, the Warsaw Pact was signed in its capital, which laid the international legal basis for the Soviet military-political bloc in Europe that had developed by that time, opposing NATO and the remilitarized Germany.

The Polish leadership was the author of a number of proposals aimed at easing international tension in Europe. In 1957, she put forward a plan to create a nuclear-free zone in Europe, which went down in the history of diplomacy under the name of the “Rapacki Plan”. Warsaw was one of the initiators of holding the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Helsinki in 1975, and an active participant in the Helsinki process. Polish troops were included in the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc returned to Poland full sovereignty and forced its political elites to look for new ways to ensure national security. In the early 90s. they leaned towards the idea of ​​creating regional unions. Initially, it was the idea of ​​uniting together with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Yugoslavia (the so-called pentacon). However, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the interethnic wars that began there prevented its implementation. Poland took an active part in the creation in the early 90s. such sub-regional structures as the Visegrad Group (together with Hungary and Czechoslovakia), the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA). She fully supported the unification of Germany.

In the first half of the 90s. participation in the European Union and NATO became a priority foreign policy goal of the main political forces of the country; integration into the already existing Western European structures of partnership and security, with a weakening interest in the Central European unions, as well as maintaining friendly relations with all countries, primarily neighboring ones, renunciation of any territorial claims. Warsaw's persistent efforts to join the North Atlantic Alliance, despite Russian opposition, have paid off. At the end of 1997, in Madrid, all NATO members adopted a unanimous decision to start the procedure for admitting Poland to this bloc, on the condition that no nuclear weapons would be deployed on its territory.

Poland is a full member or closely cooperates with many influential international economic and political organizations of regional and global nature. Among them: the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic and Social Development, etc.



2016 marks 35 years since martial law was introduced in Poland. The leader of the country, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, took responsibility for these actions.

In socialist Poland, the leading role belonged to the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), but in the 80s its political influence began to decline rapidly. And this was facilitated by the oppositional anti-communist trade union movement "Solidarity", whose activities in the country were becoming more and more tangible.

Many Poles called martial law a period of dictatorship. But at the same time, they believed that Jaruzelski made the only right choice, because his decision could prevent civil disobedience, which would necessarily end in the shedding of not only Polish, but also Russian blood.

Events leading up to the imposition of martial law in Poland

Among the socialist countries, Poland has never been the most loyal to the communist regime. After the Second World War, socio-political crises occurred here more than once, from which the government nevertheless managed to bring the country out with the hope of improving society. But in the 1980s, the situation in Poland escalated to the limit: a huge external debt accumulated, problems arose with food and basic necessities, there was another increase in food prices, rumors of corruption among representatives of the highest authorities spread throughout the country. All this led to the creation in Poland in 1980 of an independent trade union association, which soon turned into a socio-political movement in opposition to the ruling party PZPR. At the head of the Solidarity movement was Lech Walesa, an electrician from the Gdansk shipyard, around whom the opposition forces began to group. In just a few months, major Polish cities had branches of Solidarity. At first, this organization put forward only economic demands, but then political freedoms were also demanded.

In 1980, the situation in the country worsened: Edward Gierek left the post of general secretary of the PUWP, Poland was shaken by strikes and strikes. In March 1981, the largest strike took place in the country, in which about a million Poles took part. In October 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski took over the leadership of the country, who concentrated all power in his hands. At the same time, a new wave of protests and strikes began. The authorities tried to negotiate with the opposition and hold consultations on political and economic issues, but it soon became clear that it would not be possible to reach a national agreement. On December 17, 1981, Solidarity planned a nationwide strike, the dress rehearsal of which took place on December 11. At that time, thousands of people were on strike on the streets of Polish cities.

The country's leadership faced a difficult choice: either compromise with the opposition, or use force. And the Polish leadership also understood that the Soviet Union was seriously concerned about the situation in Poland and, in order to prevent the collapse of the socialist system, it could apply the option of introducing Soviet troops into the country, and this would lead to large-scale hostilities and end in bloodshed. But fortunately, the Poles were able to cope on their own, and the introduction of Soviet troops was avoided. In this difficult time, a person was found in Poland who was able to take responsibility for the events taking place in the country. And it was General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Martial law in Poland in 1981-1983

It all started at midnight on December 12-13, 1981. Looking out the window on Sunday morning, the Poles were at a loss - tanks, armored vehicles and soldiers armed with machine guns stood on the streets of their cities, telephone communications throughout the country were turned off, airports were closed, only two pro-government newspapers could be seen in the windows of newsstands - “ Tribune to the People” and “Zholnezh Liberty”. In order to keep the situation in the country under control, more than 2,000 military commissars were appointed in cities and large enterprises. On the morning of December 13, the head of state addressed the nation on television, who in a stern voice informed the Poles about the introduction of martial law in the country and the transfer of power to the Military Council of National Salvation.

Literally in the first hours after the introduction of martial law, about 3 thousand Solidarity activists were arrested - Walesa, Gvyazda, Kuron, Yavorsky and many others. In total, about 10,000 people were interned in Poland during the period of martial law.

The main strongholds of the opposition were the shipyards of Gdansk and Szczecin, the Krakow and Katowice metallurgical plants, and the Lublin Automobile Plant. They were the first to be taken under control by government forces. Polish miners put up fierce resistance to the authorities, and during its suppression, victims could not be avoided - 9 people died in one of the mines. These were the first victims, in just 1.5 years of martial law, more than a hundred Polish citizens died.

By the end of December 1981, all anti-government protests were suppressed. And in 1982, Solidarity was forced to go underground, and passive methods of public disobedience were also widely used.

On August 31, 1982, dozens of Polish cities were engulfed in a protest action, in some places accompanied by street fighting. In the autumn of 1982, there were demonstrations in Warsaw, Gdansk and Krakow. But in general, the activity of the protesters began to decline, and the government gradually began to reduce the effect of the military regime. In November of the same year, the leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa, was released, and six months later, on July 22, 1983, martial law was lifted.

Event ratings

Even 35 years after the introduction of martial law, Polish society is ambivalent about those tragic events. Some believe that this saved Poland from civil war, while others believe that martial law extended the agony of the communist regime for almost 10 more years. But we can say with confidence that it was in those difficult times that Polish democracy was born.