Montreux Black Sea Convention main provisions. Black Sea Straits: Does the Montreux Convention Work? Principles of the Montreux Convention

NATO countries ignore the treaty on the Black Sea Straits

Recently, the third US warship, the destroyer "Donald Cook", and the French military intelligence ship "Dupuy de Lome" entered the Black Sea through the Turkish straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Shortly before this, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced a violation by Turkey and the United States of the international convention of Montreux (1936), which regulates the period of presence and tonnage of foreign military vessels in the Black Sea basin. But the American and Turkish sides ignore Moscow's position. The West is clearly showing military force in connection with the situation in Ukraine and with the reunification of Crimea with Russia.

The well-known Turkish political scientist Fatih Er actually confirmed that these (NATO) "invasions" are addressed primarily to Russia.

In view of the increasingly frequent “visits” of NATO warships to the Black Sea, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that “the extension of the stay of US Navy ships in the Black Sea often exceeded the deadlines set by the International Montreux Convention.”

S. Lavrov clarified: “According to the Montreux Convention on the Status of the Straits, warships of countries that do not have access to the Black Sea can stay in its waters for no more than 21 days, and significant restrictions on the class and tonnage of the vessel have been introduced for them.”

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, “the US Navy frigate USS Taylor entered the Black Sea on February 5 and departed for the Mediterranean on March 9 of this year, which exceeded the maximum allowable period by 11 days and, accordingly, is a violation of the Convention. At the same time, the Turkish side did not inform us about this delay in a timely manner. For our part, our concerns have been brought to the attention of the American and Turkish sides in the form of notes verbale.”

Recall that since Russia's access to the Black Sea and the expansion of its Black Sea territories, ensuring their security has always rested on the Turkish policy on military navigation through the Dardanelles - the Sea of Marmara - the Bosphorus.

Russian proposals to ban military vessels from non-Black Sea countries from entering this artery between the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean have always been rejected by the European powers and Turkey, and after World War I by the United States.

For example, the Crimean War (1853-1856) of the Western coalition against Russia became possible due to the free access of European naval forces through the same straits. During the intervention of the Entente in Russia in 1918-1919. the Western fleet also passed through these straits without hindrance, not only to the Black Sea, but also to the Azov and Danube ports of Russia. It is worth recalling that Russia's allies categorically objected to the Russian naval operation in the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara during the First World War, which would have quickly taken Turkey out of the war.

In 1915, the Entente wanted to capture Constantinople and thereby close the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara from Russia, but in vain! That was the unsuccessful Gallipoli operation of 1915, carried out without the participation of Russian troops. However, during the previous Russian-Turkish wars, the European powers threatened Russia with almost a collective invasion of its territory if the Russian troops "dared" to enter Constantinople and seize the Bosphorus. On the other hand, the many years and numerous bloody battles of the troops of Russia and Turkey in the Balkans and in the Eastern Turkish mountains, including in 1914-1917, did not cause discontent among the powers of Europe: let Russians and Turks kill each other more. And although after 1918 until the mid-1930s there was a thaw in Soviet-Turkish relations, Ankara did not agree with Moscow's proposal for the indefinite demilitarization of the straits and for bilateral Soviet-Turkish military security.

Under pressure from London, Paris and Washington, on July 24, 1923 in Lausanne (Switzerland) the International Convention on the Regime of the Straits was signed. It was signed by Great Britain, France, the USSR, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The convention provided for the demilitarization of the strait zone, but allowed free passage through the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles not only for merchant and passenger ships, but also for military ships of any country. Therefore, the USSR did not ratify the Convention. As follows from the statement of the Soviet NKID, "... due to the lack of proper security conditions for the straits, the Black Sea basin as a whole and, accordingly, the southern borders of the USSR." In the future, the Soviet side was able to achieve a partial revision of the regime for the straits.

In the Swiss city of Montreux, on July 21, 1936, the Convention on the Status of the Straits, which is still in force today, was signed. It was signed and ratified by the USSR, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Japan.

The document preserves for merchant ships of all countries the freedom of passage through the straits in peacetime and wartime. But the mode of passage of warships is different for the Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. With prior notification of the Turkish authorities, the Black Sea countries can conduct their warships of any class in peacetime. And for military ships of non-Black Sea states, restrictions on class and tonnage have been introduced. Only small and auxiliary surface ships can pass here, and the total tonnage of military vessels of non-Black Sea countries in the Black Sea should not exceed 30,000 tons, although this volume may increase to 45,000 tons if the Black Sea countries increase their navies in the region. The term of stay of "non-Black Sea" military courts was limited to 21 days (Moscow insisted on 14 days, but the British achieved more).

As for Turkey's policy in the straits, the Convention introduced the following rules: in the event of Turkey's participation in the war, and if Turkey considers that it is threatened by war, the Turkish side is granted the right to allow / prohibit the passage of military ships of any countries through the straits. And during a war in which Turkey does not participate, the straits are closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power.

In addition, the Montreux Convention abolished the international commission on the straits established by the Lausanne Convention, its functions, and with them sovereignty in this region, were transferred to Turkey.

But during the Great Patriotic War, the Turkish straits were used by Germany and its allies for operations against the USSR. In an effort to smooth out such a hostile policy along the straits, Turkey at the end of February 1945 declared war on Germany and Japan. And from mid-April 1945, it allowed the delivery of allied cargo to Soviet ports through the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. The total volume of these deliveries to the Black Sea ports of the USSR in 1945 amounted to 681 thousand tons, which approximately corresponds to 5% of all allied deliveries to the USSR. Over 300 thousand tons arrived in Batumi, up to 100 thousand tons - in Poti, the rest of the cargo was received by the ports of Sukhumi and Tuapse. Nevertheless, on March 19, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty "On Friendship and Neutrality" (December 1925).

And then, on June 7, 1945, V.M. Molotov told Turkish Ambassador to the USSR S. Sarper that “the desirable conditions for concluding a new agreement are a regime of exclusively Soviet-Turkish control in the Black Sea straits and their demilitarization. With the deployment of a Soviet naval base in this area under a long-term lease "(similar to the Soviet bases of Porkkalla-Udd in Finland or Dalny in China in 1945-1955). But Ankara rejected these projects.

At the beginning of the Potsdam Conference, Molotov repeated these proposals, adding that "... we have repeatedly stated to our allies that the USSR cannot consider the Montreux Convention correct."

Then the problem was discussed with the participation of Stalin himself, who refuted the thesis about the threat to Turkey from the USSR. Noting that “the Turks in the region of Constantinople have over 20 divisions, perhaps 23 or 24 divisions. And, owning the Straits, a small state, supported by England, holds a large state by the throat and does not give it a passage.

Great Britain and the United States vigorously stood up for Turkey and for the Montreux Convention. But under pressure from the USSR, and taking into account the pro-Soviet position on this issue of Greece, close to the straits, in section XVI “Black Sea Straits” of the final protocol of the conference it was said: “The Convention on the Straits, concluded in Montreux, should be revised as not meeting the conditions of the present. We agreed that as a next step, this issue will be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.”

But Moscow decided to “squeeze” Ankara on its own. On August 7, 1946, the government of the USSR issued a note in which the above-mentioned demands were repeated. However, this time the United States and Great Britain expressed unequivocal support for Turkey. Already in the late 1940s, US military and intelligence bases appeared in Turkey, including some of its Black Sea regions, and in February 1952, Turkey and Greece joined NATO. Thus, the navies of the NATO countries in the Black Sea received carte blanche. Moreover, the Montreux Convention, we repeat, does not forbid the presence of "non-Black Sea" navies in this basin.

And on May 30, 1953, the Soviet government officially abandoned Stalin's demands, and in the future the USSR never raised the issue of the regime of the straits. Even during the Caribbean crisis (October 1962). Moscow feared to “put pressure” on Ankara again, which could provoke an increase in the military presence of the United States and, in general, NATO in the Black Sea region. At the same time, according to available data, NATO, including Turkey, in the 1960s-1980s. violated the military terms of the Montreux Convention at least 30 times. There is a version that NATO naval intelligence had a hand - again through the straits - in the destruction of the battleship Novorossiysk in 1955 near Sevastopol ...

During the preparation and holding of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (early-mid 1970s), the United States, Great Britain and Turkey made it clear that they were not inclined to change anything in the Convention and that a return to this issue could delay the signing of the final Act . Moscow chose not to extend these terms. And in 1991-1992. Russia, Ukraine and Georgia joined the Convention instead of the USSR.

Today it is obvious that the Montreux Convention, having retained the possibility for direct and indirect military-political provocations against Russia, suits the West quite well.

Moreover, given the current openly hostile attitude of the Kiev junta towards Russia, as it was, say, during the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008. Therefore, it is hardly possible for the signatory countries of the Montreux Convention to create, for example, a commission to verify the implementation of all the rules of this document or to clarify them.

By the way, in the second half of the 1940s - early 1950s, the USSR repeatedly proposed the creation of such a commission. The idea was supported by Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece. Western countries and Turkey did not respond to such proposals. But if the provisions of this Convention can be violated even by non-Black Sea countries, and without consequences, then Russia will have to look for symmetrical answers. Instead of appealing more to the Montreux Convention, which is not respected by other signatory countries located, we note, distant lands from the Black Sea ...

Special for the Centenary

Story

The conference on the regime of the Black Sea straits was held on June 22 - July 21 in Montreux (Switzerland) with the participation of the USSR, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan. The conference was convened at the suggestion of Turkey in order to revise the convention on the regime of the Black Sea straits, adopted at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23. Italy refused to participate in the conference, as the participating countries supported international sanctions against Italy in connection with the situation in Ethiopia. At the conference in Montreux, Great Britain came up with a proposal to equalize the rights of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers to the passage of their warships through the straits, which would lead to a restriction of the rights of passage of the ships of the Soviet Navy. The work of the conference was further complicated by the collusion between the Turkish delegation and the British delegation. The Soviet Union took a principled position. Ultimately, the conference was not disrupted and led to the development of agreed decisions. On July 20, the participating countries signed a new convention on the regime of the straits, on the basis of which Turkey received the right to remilitarize the straits zone.

Main provisions of the convention

The Montreux Convention preserves the freedom of passage through the strait for merchant ships of all countries, both in peacetime and in wartime. However, the regime for the passage of warships is different in relation to the Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. Subject to prior notice to the Turkish authorities, the Black Sea powers can pass through the straits in peacetime their warships of any class. Significant restrictions on class (only small surface ships pass) and on tonnage have been introduced for warships of non-Black Sea powers. The total tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea should not exceed 30 thousand tons (with the possibility of increasing this minimum to 45 thousand tons in case of an increase in the naval forces of the Black Sea countries) with a stay of no more than 21 days. In the event of Turkey's participation in the war, and also if Turkey considers that it is directly threatened by war, it has the right to allow or prohibit the passage through the straits of any warships. During a war in which Turkey is not involved, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. The convention liquidated the international commission on the straits provided for by the Lausanne Convention with the transfer of its functions to the government of Turkey.

Significance of the convention

The decisions adopted at the conference in Montreux became for their time a step forward towards recognizing the rights of the Black Sea countries in the issue of the status of the straits. Italy acceded to the Montreux Convention in 1938.

Sources

Principles of the Montreux Convention

The main principle of the convention, fixed in its first chapter, is the principle of the right of freedom of passage and navigation in both straits.

For civilian ships, complete freedom of passage through the straits in wartime and peacetime is preserved.

With warships, everything is much more complicated. Countries that have access to the Black Sea can conduct any ships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Image copyright Reuters Image caption Certain restrictions apply to, for example, supertankers

They are only required to notify the Turkish government through diplomatic channels.

There is a special regime for ships of non-Black Sea countries. They cannot conduct ships with a displacement of more than 30 thousand tons and for a period of more than 21 days into the Black Sea.

True, there are reservations that allow, under special conditions, to increase the tonnage.

In the event of a war in which Turkey is involved, she can close the straits for the country with which she is at war, as well as for any warships.

At the same time, it is specifically stipulated that Turkey has the right to do the same if it only suspects that it is in danger.

The convention provides for a mechanism to lift these measures, but most of the countries that have signed the convention can set it in motion.

In addition, there are some conditions for passage, such as the passage through the straits of submarines on the surface, and others.

Bypassing the laws

The principles of the Montreux Convention, according to experts, are rather vague, and allow Turkey to impose some restrictions on passage through the straits.

So, for example, it does not stipulate in any way what grounds Turkey should have in order to consider that it has a threat of direct military danger from any state.

In addition, not only the provisions of the Montreux Convention or the laws of the sea are valid in the Straits, but also the rules that Turkey has introduced unilaterally.

In accordance with these navigation rules, Turkey has the right not only to close the strait, but, as they say, to suspend navigation Vasily Gutsulyak, head of the Center for Maritime Law

Among these rules, there are those that do not comply with international conventions: for example, Turkey insists on the use of a pilot, sets certain deadlines for the filing and validity of notifications, or requires warships to pass through the straits only during the daytime.

As military expert Andrei Soyustov told the BBC, Russia (like the USSR before it) simply ignores many of these rules, but agrees with some.

"For example, they did not agree with the requirement to submit a notice of passage for a very long time, this period was reduced to almost a day, but they met Turkey halfway so that our warships would pass through the straits only during daylight hours," he said.

According to Soyustov, the Black Sea Fleet also learned how to bypass the inconvenient notification system through diplomatic channels.

“In the morning, we take and send a list of those ships that, even purely theoretically, can pass through the straits. These are not only ships in the Black Sea, but also ships of the Mediterranean group. Just in case. We throw it to them every day,” he said.

Another trick is the transfer of civilian ships to the Black Sea Fleet - when they become auxiliary ships of the Navy, they are subject to fewer restrictions on the passage of the straits.

Russia has already taken advantage of this by transferring purchased civilian vessels to the category of warships some time ago to supply military cargo to a group in Syria.

In other words, in many respects the current practice of applying the existing conventions in relation to the straits actually includes a lot of overt or covert informal agreements, concessions and traditions.

Can Turkey close the straits?

Head of the Maritime Law Center Vasily Gutsulyak said that according to the unilaterally introduced "Rules of Navigation", Turkey has some opportunities to block the straits.

In the event of a blockage of the straits, we do not have the ability to quickly and decisively unblock them. We can ditch our ships there, but not unlock them Andrey Soyustov, military expert

“In accordance with these navigation rules, Turkey has the right not only to close the strait, but, as stated in the rules, to suspend navigation. In particular, they are talking about hydraulic works, even, for example, sports events, or an environmental disaster. so-called forced circumstances. And in the event of these so-called forced circumstances, Turkey has the right to suspend shipping," he said.

At the same time, as the expert explained, we are talking about both civil and military courts.

Image copyright Thinkstock Image caption Turkey may close the straits if it suspects that it is in danger

Of course, any blocking of the straits in a situation of increased tension (and such a step is likely to arise against the backdrop of aggravated relations between Turkey and another state) cannot be done without any reason.

As Andrey Soyustov explained, even if Turkey, in strict accordance with the Montreux Convention, decides to close the strait out of suspicion that it is in danger, it will have to present strong arguments to the international community, otherwise it will be considered a violator of international laws and even an aggressor.

"However, I am sure that in such a situation Russia will not rush into the straits, since in the military format we absolutely do not need it. Why do we need the straits at all? To a) trade through them; b) supply the Syrian group. In the event of the straits being blocked "We don't have the ability to quickly and decisively unblock them. We can destroy our ships there, but we can't unblock them. Accordingly, it will be necessary to look for a solution through other channels, the ships will turn around and return to their bases," he said.

The Montreux Convention on the Status of the Straits (Convention de Montreux) regulates navigation in the Bosporus and Dardanelles and in the Sea of Marmara. The Bosphorus Strait connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles - the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean.

The convention was signed in Montreux (Switzerland) on July 20, 1936, and entered into force on November 9 of the same year. Eleven countries are party to the convention - the USSR, Australia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Great Britain, Cyprus (since 1969), Turkey, Yugoslavia, Japan, and France.

The convention consists of 29 articles, 16 of which relate to warships, six are related to civil ships.

The main objective of the convention is to revise the results of the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23, which approved the principle of unrestricted passage of military and merchant ships of all countries to the Black Sea and back both in peacetime and in wartime.

The Montreux Convention secured Turkish sovereignty over the straits. The international commission on the straits envisaged in Lausanne was liquidated, the functions of monitoring and controlling the passage of ships through the straits were transferred to Turkey.

According to the convention, the merchant ships of all countries retained freedom of passage through the straits both in peacetime and in wartime. The Convention recognizes the special position of the Black Sea states. In peacetime, provided they notify Turkey eight days in advance, warships of any class, including submarines, have the right to pass through the straits.

For warships of non-Black Sea powers, restrictions on class and tonnage have been introduced. The total tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea states simultaneously in the Black Sea (no more than nine ships) should not exceed 30,000 tons (or 45,000 if the naval forces of the Black Sea countries increase). The period of stay of these ships at sea is no more than 21 days. The tonnage of ships of one non-Black Sea country should not exceed 2/3 of the total tonnage of the ships of these countries located in the Black Sea. These countries must notify Turkey through diplomatic channels 15 days in advance of the passage of warships.

If one or more non-Black Sea countries send ships to the straits for humanitarian purposes, then their total tonnage should not exceed 8,000 tons.

Article 15 of the convention states that "warships passing through the straits in transit may not in any case use the aircraft that might be on them."

In the event of Turkey's participation in the war, as well as the threat of war, it can prohibit the passage through the straits of any warships. During a war in which Turkey does not take part, it has the right to prohibit the transit of the ships of the belligerent country.

The small Swiss town of Montreux entered the history of international relations 80 years ago, in the summer of 1936, when one of the key issues of European politics, which for a long time served as the cause of many conflicts, was decided here - the issue of the Black Sea straits.

View of Montreux

Located on the picturesque shore of Lake Geneva, Montreux became a favorite vacation spot for Russian writers and composers at the end of the 19th century. came here Pyotr Tchaikovsky and Lev Tolstoy. The last years of his life, from 1960 to 1977, he spent in Montreux Vladimir Nabokov- and was buried there. But the whole world started talking about this town in 1936...

"From the Varangians to the Greeks"

The issue of the Black Sea acquired importance for the Eastern Slavs in the early period of the development of Russian statehood. Already in the treaty of the prince Oleg with the Byzantines, concluded in 907, it was about the terms of trade on the Black Sea: Russian merchants were granted a number of privileges, they were exempted from paying duties to Constantinople. At that time, there was a path "from the Varangians to the Greeks", connecting Northern Europe with Southern Europe, Scandinavia with the Byzantine Empire. In fact, Ancient Russia controlled the entire route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The significance of the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” began to decline at the beginning of the 13th century, not least because of the sack of the capital of Byzantium by the Crusaders in 1204. In addition, a difficult era of feudal fragmentation began in Russia.

Interest in the Black Sea resumed after the unification of the Russian principalities around Moscow. There were several reasons for this, and above all, the existence of a constant threat from the south, from the Crimean Khanate, which regularly raided Russian lands in order to rob and capture slaves (the fight against it would last for more than one century). The concept of "Moscow - the Third Rome" was also important, according to which Russia claimed succession from Byzantium, which became the ideological justification for the desire to master Constantinople. However, the straits as such had not yet acquired paramount importance at that time.

Everything changed with the conclusion in 1774 of the Kyuchuk-Kaynarji peace, which ended the next Russian-Turkish war. According to the peace treaty, Russia received not only full access to the Black Sea, but also the right to have its own navy on it, as well as the possibility of free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Russian merchant ships were equalized in rights with English and French. Since that time, Russia began not only to win back the Black Sea lands from Turkey, which until then was the sovereign mistress of the Black Sea (in fact, it was its inland sea), but also to defend its interests in the strait zone on a par with the European powers.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk - First President of Turkey

At the same time, the famous "Greek project" appeared. Catherine II, according to which Byzantium, headed by the grandson of the Empress, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, was to be recreated on the lands of the Balkan Peninsula liberated from the Turks. In 1787, during a visit to the Crimea, Catherine II ordered to decorate the gates of the Sevastopol fortress under construction with the inscription: "The road to Constantinople." It was an unambiguous manifesto of the new Eastern policy of the Russian Empire.

However, it would be wrong to say that Russian-Turkish relations on the issue of the Black Sea straits were limited exclusively to confrontation - Russian diplomacy made a number of unsuccessful attempts to conclude a military-political agreement with the Turks. So, in 1799, in the conditions of the Napoleonic Wars, Russia, being a member of the anti-French coalition, went for rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire. The latter, we note, rather needed this, since it turned out to be unable to independently protect the straits due to significant losses suffered by it in confrontation with Napoleon in Egypt. According to the agreement, the Turks recognized the special rights of Russia in the Black Sea and granted the right of unhindered passage through the straits to its merchant and military ships. True, the vector of Russian foreign policy soon changed again: in connection with the reorientation of St. Petersburg towards an alliance with Napoleon, which was marked by the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit, the alliance with the Ottoman Empire did not last long.

G.V. Chicherin - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR (later the USSR) from 1918 to 1930

In 1806, a new Russo-Turkish war began, which brought Russia privileges regarding the use of the straits in accordance with the Bucharest peace treaty signed in 1812. The next war, 1828-1829, ended with the peace of Adrianople, also beneficial for Russia. And in 1833, in the town of Unkar-Iskelesi near Istanbul, an agreement was signed between the Russian and Ottoman empires, which formalized their military alliance. Among other things, it provided that in the event of an attack on Russia by a third party, the sultan was obliged to close the straits to any foreign warships, thereby guaranteeing the security of Russia's southern borders. As for the idea of conquering Constantinople, Emperor Nicholas I at that time abandoned it, believing that a weak Turkey was more beneficial for Russia than its division.

However, this union did not last long: the traditional contradictions between the two powers turned out to be stronger. The dissatisfaction of Great Britain and France, who lost the most from the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty, also played a role. In 1841, after the expiration of its validity, the London Straits Convention was concluded, which was much more in line with English interests than Russian ones. The security of the southern borders of Russia was now not guaranteed at all, since the Sultan could open the straits to foreign allies in the event of a military conflict.

This is exactly what happened during the Crimean War, which resulted in the Russian and Ottoman empires, in particular, the ban on having a navy on the Black Sea (in the first place, this hit Russia, since Turkey retained the right to maintain naval forces in the neighboring Marmara and Mediterranean seas). Another result of this war was the closure of the straits for warships in peacetime. Russia will restore the Black Sea Fleet, having received the appropriate right in 1871, but the issue of the straits will remain acute for several more decades.

KINYAPINA N.S. The Balkans and Straits in Russia's Foreign Policy at the End of the 19th Century (1878–1898). M., 1994;
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A. V. Ignatiev, L. N. Nezhinsky and others. Russia and the Black Sea Straits (XVIII-XX centuries) / M., 1999.

Long way to compromise

Defeat in the First World War brought Turkey to the brink of extinction as an independent state. In 1920, she was forced to conclude the Treaty of Sevres with her Entente allies (among whom there was no Russia, which was being shaken by the Civil War at that time), on extremely unfavorable terms. Almost the entire territory of the former Ottoman Empire was subject to partition, the size of the Turkish army was strictly limited, a foreign protectorate was actually established over the country, but most importantly, Constantinople and the straits were declared an international demilitarized zone, the management of which was entrusted to the great powers. Thus, it was supposed to put an end to the issue of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, excluding any participation of Turkey in deciding their fate.

However, the Treaty of Sevres was not even ratified by the Turkish government: indignation at its conditions reached such a limit in the country that the civil war that was starting in it flared up in full force. The official sultan's government was opposed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (this is how the Turkish Parliament is called today), headed by General Mustafa Kemal, disagreeing with the terms of peace with the Entente. By the way, Soviet Russia provided considerable support to him, one of the first in the world to recognize the government of Kemal in Ankara, providing the rebels with weapons, ammunition, shells and gold, and, under the Moscow Treaty of 1921, also transferring the territory of the Kars region. In the autumn of 1922, it became clear that Kemal's troops were winning. The Entente signed an armistice that ended hostilities and canceled a number of clauses of the Treaty of Sevres until a new agreement was concluded. Sultan soon Mehmed VI left the country, and Turkey finally became a republic.

V.V. Vorovsky, a member of the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne Conference, was killed in Lausanne by a former White Guard officer M. Konradi

However, the urgency of the issue of the straits remained - the need for a full-fledged peace treaty was obvious. A conference specially convened to prepare such a treaty was held in Lausanne from November 20, 1922 to July 24, 1923. Turkey, Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the future Yugoslavia), Japan and the USA became its participants. Representatives of Bulgaria and the RSFSR were also invited to the conference, but their participation, according to the decision of the Entente countries, was limited exclusively to the question of the straits. Despite the stated protest against such discrimination, the Soviet delegation, headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin nevertheless took part in the conference.

MM. Litvinov - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR from 1930 to 1939

The position of the RSFSR was to defend the territorial integrity of Turkey in accordance with the Moscow Treaty, as well as to support the Turkish government in protest against the capitulation regime and a request to cancel the country's external debts. As for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the representatives of the RSFSR advocated their complete opening to merchant ships of all countries and complete closure to military, armed ships and military aviation of all states, with the exception of Turkey itself. Thus, the Soviet side was almost the only ally of Turkey at the Lausanne Conference.

This option did not suit the Western powers, and if there were practically no contradictions in the discussion regarding merchant shipping, then it was difficult for the conference participants to reach an agreement on the issue of military ships in the straits. In particular, Great Britain demanded international control over the straits and their complete demilitarization (destruction of coastal fortifications), seeking to preserve the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. Other powers (primarily France) advocated a softer option: the passage of military ships of any countries was declared free in peacetime, and in wartime, subject to the neutrality of Turkey (in the case of her participation in the war, free passage was allowed only to ships of neutral states).

The contradictions turned out to be so sharp that in February 1923 it was decided to temporarily suspend the conference. The Soviet side was not officially informed about the resumption of its work at the end of April, so our representatives arrived in Switzerland late. The situation became even more complicated on May 10, when in the same place, in Lausanne, a former White Guard officer Maurice Conradi one of the members of the Soviet delegation was killed Vaclav Vorovsky. At the last stage of the conference, the participation of the Soviet side was seriously limited.

The result of long negotiations was the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which turned out to be much more beneficial for Turkey than the previous one: territorial losses became smaller, the privileges of foreign states and companies provided for earlier by the capitulation regime were canceled, a foreign protectorate did not operate, and the external debt of the Ottoman Empire was reduced. Most of these points of the treaty, which were successful for Turkey, were secured thanks to the position of the Soviet delegation.

Bosporus strait

Meanwhile, with regard to the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the decision, designed to become a compromise, turned out to be half-hearted: the convention established free passage through the straits of merchant and military ships of any flag, both in peacetime and in wartime, but under British pressure, a clause on the demilitarization of the straits was included in it , as well as the introduction of restrictions on the number of passing ships. The established International Commission of the Straits, which included representatives of the countries participating in the conference (except the United States), actually gained control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (despite the fact that nominally they remained Turkish territory). Its mission was to prevent possible conflicts.

The USSR did not ratify this convention, since in practice it significantly infringed on its interests as a Black Sea power and did not protect against possible aggression from non-Black Sea states.

Swiss arrangements

By the beginning of the 1930s, the position that the Lausanne conference had determined was not beneficial to any of the Black Sea countries. The general deterioration of the international situation affected: the intervention of Japan in Manchuria, the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, the attack of fascist Italy on Ethiopia. There was a need to reconsider the regime of the straits, for which, on the initiative of Turkey, a new international meeting was convened in June 1936 - this time in Montreux. It brought together representatives of the same states as in Lausanne thirteen years earlier (with the exception of the United States and Italy), Australia became a new participant in the negotiations.

For the Soviet Union, the complete closure of the straits for the passage of military ships was unprofitable, since this deprived it of the opportunity to transfer its naval forces to the Black Sea from other seas (for example, from the Baltic). At the same time, their full opening meant a weakening of control over the situation in the Black Sea, the deprivation of the USSR of primacy and the emergence of a threat of attack from non-Black Sea powers. Closing the straits for warships of non-Black Sea powers seemed ideal, but this option was categorically rejected by Western countries. Therefore, the most balanced position was required from Soviet diplomats.

As expected, the problem of remilitarization of the straits and the restoration of coastal fortifications did not cause discussion at the conference, the point on the free passage of merchant ships remained unshakable. The issue of military courts turned out to be the most difficult again: the British delegation stubbornly refused to recognize the Black Sea powers (primarily Turkey and the USSR) as having the right to any special conditions, thereby trying to maintain British influence in the region. Soviet delegation led by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov defended the thesis about the special position of our country. So the atmosphere at the conference was very tense, and the main antagonists at it were the USSR and Great Britain.

Despite the tough positions of the parties, the participants in the Montreux conference managed to reach an agreement in just a month. The main requirements of the USSR were accepted: first of all, the Black Sea states were given a more favorable regime than non-Black Sea ones. The International Commission of the Straits was liquidated, and all power over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles passed to Turkey. It was her other Black Sea powers that from now on had to give advance notice of the passage of warships, while their tonnage in peacetime was not limited in any way.

But in relation to non-Black Sea states, restrictions were imposed both on the tonnage of ships, and on their class and time of stay in the Black Sea - no more than 21 days. In the event of a war in which Turkey remains neutral, the straits must be closed to the passage of warships of any belligerent power. If Turkey takes part in the war or sees a threat of attack for itself, then the decision to let military ships through the straits should be entirely at its discretion.

Potskhveriya B.M. Black Sea straits in Russian-Turkish relations // Russian-Turkish relations: history, current state and prospects. M., 2003

"Don't let him pass"

At first glance, the Soviet delegation might have been celebrating a diplomatic victory. She managed to achieve almost all of her goals: the new convention protected the rights of the Black Sea states and contributed to strengthening peace in the region. Great Britain had to come to terms with the weakening of its influence here.

However, Turkey was the first to win, for the first time after the First World War, it significantly strengthened its positions in the region and received the right to independently regulate the throughput regime of the straits in the event of a military threat to it. Moreover, she herself could decide whether such a threat exists or not. And this is an important factor: in the future, as Ankara drew closer to Western countries, Soviet-Turkish relations became more and more cool, which made it possible for Western countries to indirectly influence the situation in the Black Sea region. Joseph Stalin subsequently stated: "... a small state, supported by England, holds a large state by the throat and does not give it a pass."

Already after the war, at the Potsdam Conference, the USSR proposed to revise the existing situation with an eye to creating a naval base in the Dardanelles to ensure freedom of access to the straits, regardless of Turkey. In addition, the Soviet government demanded that Ankara return the territories previously transferred to it under the Moscow Treaty. These attempts were not crowned with success and were abandoned in the early 1950s. In turn, the aspirations of the United States, which sought the right to free passage through the straits and, accordingly, the removal of restrictions for non-Black Sea countries, were also not satisfied. Thus, the status quo was preserved.

Despite some flaring controversy around the problem of the straits that took place in the second half of the twentieth century, the Montreux Convention continues to operate today. However, over the past years, the situation in the Black Sea region has seriously changed. In particular, since 1936, the tonnage of ships has noticeably increased and the nature of cargo has changed. After the collapse of the USSR, the number of Black Sea states increased. Do not forget that Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania have become NATO members, which means they are bound by a number of military obligations and agreements with non-Black Sea states.

It is known that in 2008, during the conflict in South Ossetia and in 2014, in connection with the events in Ukraine, US Navy ships in the Black Sea exceeded the maximum allowable stay there under the Montreux Convention. Therefore, it is possible that in the future this agreement will still be revised and give way to a new document that is more in line with the times and the international situation.

Nikita Brusilovsky

Alexander Nevsky: God is not in power, but in truth God is not in power, but

Plans to bypass the us convention montre