The August putsch is a political coup that took place in Moscow in August 1991, the goal of which was to overthrow the existing government and change the vector of the country's development, preventing the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The August putsch took place from August 19 to 21, 1991, and became, in fact, the reason for the further collapse of the USSR, although its goal was a completely different development of events. As a result of the coup, members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), a self-proclaimed body that assumed the responsibilities of the main body of government, wanted to come to power. However, the State Emergency Committee's attempts to seize power failed, and all members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.
The main reason for the putsch was dissatisfaction with the policy of perestroika pursued by M.S. Gorbachev, and the disastrous results of his reforms.
Reasons for the August coup
After a period of stagnation in the USSR, the country was in a very difficult situation - a political, economic, food and cultural crisis flared up. The situation was getting worse every day; it was urgent to carry out reforms and reorganize the economy and the country's governance system. This was done by the current leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. Initially, his reforms were assessed generally positively and were called “perestroika”, but time passed and the changes did not bring any results - the country plunged deeper and deeper into crisis.
As a result of the failure of Gorbachev’s internal political activities, discontent began to grow sharply in the ruling structures, a crisis of confidence in the leader arose, and not only his opponents, but also his recent comrades-in-arms spoke out against Gorbachev. All this led to the idea of a conspiracy to overthrow the current government beginning to mature.
The last straw was Gorbachev's decision to transform the Soviet Union into a Union of Sovereign States, that is, to actually give the republics independence, political and economic. This did not suit the conservative part of the ruling sector, who stood for maintaining the power of the CPSU and governing the country from the center. On August 5, Gorbachev leaves for negotiations, and at the same time the organization of a conspiracy to overthrow him begins. The purpose of the conspiracy is to prevent the collapse of the USSR.
Chronology of events of the August putsch
The performance began on August 19 and took only three days. Members of the new government, first of all, read out the documents they had adopted the day before, which especially pointed out the insolvency of the existing government. First of all, a decree signed by the Vice-President of the USSR G. Yanaev was read out, which stated that Gorbachev could no longer fulfill the duties of head of state due to health conditions, so Yanaev himself would perform his duties. Next, a “statement of the Soviet leadership” was read, which stated that a new body of state power had been proclaimed - the State Emergency Committee, which included the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council O.D. Baklanov, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov, Prime Minister of the USSR V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Pugo, as well as the President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial, Construction and Transport Facilities A.I. Tizyakov. Yanaev himself was appointed head of the State Emergency Committee.
Next, the members of the State Emergency Committee addressed citizens with a statement saying that the political freedoms that Gorbachev gave led to the creation of a number of anti-Soviet structures that sought to seize power by force, collapse the USSR and destroy the country completely. In order to counter this, it is necessary to change the government. On the same day, the leaders of the State Emergency Committee issued the first resolution, which prohibited all associations that were not legalized in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR. At the same moment, many parties and circles in opposition to the CPSU were dissolved, censorship was reintroduced, and many newspapers and other media were closed.
In order to ensure the new order, troops were sent to Moscow on August 19. However, the GKChP’s struggle for power was not simple - the President of the RSFSR B.N. spoke out against them. Yeltsin, who issued a decree that all executive bodies must strictly obey the President of Russia (RSFSR). Thus, he managed to organize a good defense and resist the State Emergency Committee. The confrontation between the two structures ended on August 20 with Yeltsin’s victory. All members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested immediately.
On the 21st, Gorbachev returns to the country, who immediately receives a number of ultimatums from the new government, which he is forced to agree to. As a result, Gorbachev renounces the post of Chairman of the CPSU Central Committee, dissolves the CPSU, the Cabinet of Ministers, republican ministries and a number of other government bodies. Gradually, the collapse of all government structures begins.
The meaning and results of the August putsch
Members of the State Emergency Committee conceived the August putsch as a measure that should prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union, which by that time was in the deepest crisis, but the attempt not only failed, in many ways it was the putsch that accelerated the events that happened next. The Soviet Union finally showed itself as an insolvent structure, the government was completely reorganized, and various republics gradually began to emerge and gain independence.
The Soviet Union gave way to the Russian Federation.
MOSCOW, August 18 – RIA Novosti. The leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov sees the reasons for the defeat of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) in 1991 in the fact that its leaders were disconnected from the people.
“The reasons for the defeat are that those who led the State Emergency Committee were disconnected from the people. If they had directly addressed the citizens, I assure you, the whole country would have supported it, it was ready for this,” Zyuganov said at a press conference in Moscow.
He noted that only Boris Yeltsin’s entourage in Moscow opposed the State Emergency Committee. “In not a single settlement in the vast country has not a single collective spoken out against the appeals of those who headed the State Emergency Committee,” added the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
In addition, according to Zyuganov, everything was done extremely late.
Yuri Boldyrev: thousands of people came to protect the Leningrad City Council buildingOn the night of August 19, 1991, a coup attempt was made in the USSR. Then thousands of people stood up in defense of democratically elected authorities. Yuri Boldyrev, who spent all three days of the putsch in the Leningrad City Council building, told RIA Novosti about the events of 25 years ago.“And most importantly, there was no leader who could give the appropriate order. They were obliged to do what any government leader is obliged to do, he is obliged to preserve the integrity of the country, preserve the safety of citizens, preserve the traditional attitude towards the state. None of these decisions were made by them They didn’t accept it then,” Zyuganov emphasized.
According to the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the real coup was not carried out by members of the State Emergency Committee. “I declare to you with authority: the coup was carried out by Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze - this whole pack that forcibly seized power and ignored all conceivable and inconceivable decisions, primarily the Constitution of the USSR,” he noted.
“This is a crime without a statute of limitations, which was committed by Gorbachev, Yeltsin and others like them. This crime will sooner or later be fully investigated, the documents have been preserved, all are intact, there are eyewitnesses. I assure you, appropriate solutions will be found there. Without making an honest decision on this issue It’s very difficult for the country to recover,” Zyuganov said.
On the night of August 19, 1991, representatives of the top leadership of the USSR, who disagreed with the reform policies of President Mikhail Gorbachev and the draft of the new Union Treaty, created the State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP). August 19, 1991 went down in history as the “August putsch”: an attempt was made to remove Gorbachev from the presidency and change the course he was pursuing. Several dozen tanks came close to the House of the Supreme Council and Government of the RSFSR (White House). The resistance to the putschists was led by the President of the RSFSR, Boris Yeltsin. He qualified the creation of the State Emergency Committee as a coup attempt; allied departments, including security forces, were reassigned to the president of the RSFSR.
It is unlikely that, when holding a Referendum on March 17, 1991 on the issue of preserving the USSR, the “perestroika” leaders counted on the fact that the Soviet people would give the go-ahead for the collapse of their great Motherland. Obviously, in connection with this, they concocted the question of preserving the renewed Union. And when 76% of citizens spoke in favor of preserving the USSR, the democratic scoundrels were left with a backup option - to ruin the Soviet Union by “renewing” it
This is what Gorbachev immediately took up, starting the criminal “Novo-Ogarevo process” of preparing a new Union Treaty. The draft of this Treaty, the adoption of which was scheduled for August 20, was prepared secretly. It avoided everything that would talk about the socialist system, our state was no longer defined as “socialist”, but as “democratic” and was renamed the “Union of Sovereign States”. Only 7-8 republics out of 15 intended to participate in this Union. It is clear that to accept the Treaty, which rejects our constitutional system and inevitably leads to the destruction of a single state, would mean committing an anti-Soviet coup d'etat behind the backs of the people.
However Yeltsin I wasn’t even happy with such a bastard Treaty. He sought to destroy the Soviet Union even faster and more cynically. Using the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR, adopted back on June 12, 1990, which provides for the supremacy of Russian laws over those of the Union, he hastily takes emergency measures that paralyze the possibility of the operation of the USSR Constitution, the activities of the CPSU on the territory of Russia and provoke similar steps by all Union republics. As a result, on the eve of August 20, Yeltsin created all the necessary organizational prerequisites for disrupting Gorbachev’s and carrying out his own, even more reactionary, coup d’etat.
Gorbachev knew about this and, as the President of the USSR, was obliged to do everything possible, up to and including declaring a state of emergency, to stop Yeltsin’s plans. Surrounded by some members of the Government and the Politburo, he spoke directly about this need. However, as always, Gorbachev thought one thing, said another, and did a third. This time, having instructed the country's leaders to resolutely restore order and legality, this Judas On August 4, I prudently flew away on vacation.
August 20th was approaching. It was impossible to allow the signing of the “Novo-Ogarevsky” Union Treaty initiated by Gorbachev, but to an even greater extent it was impossible to allow the coup d’etat prepared by Yeltsin to take place. In such conditions, a number of top officials of the USSR formed the State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP) on August 18, 1991. Let us recall the main events related to the State Emergency Committee.
On Sunday 18 August O. Baklanov, V. Boldin, O. Shenin And V. Varennikov visit Gorbachev in Foros and receive his approval in principle for decisive action.
On the morning of Monday, August 19, troops are brought into Moscow, the “Statement of the Soviet Leadership”, “Address of the State Emergency Committee to the Soviet People”, “Appeal to the Heads of State, Government and the UN Secretary General”, as well as the Decrees of the State Emergency Committee are announced.
Both these and all subsequent documents of the State Emergency Committee do not name any specific persons or forces responsible for the plight of the country, and do not call workers to any specific actions in the name of defending the Motherland and socialism. Only O. Shenin seeks to introduce the necessary specifics, having independently sent a coded message to the first secretaries of the republics, territories and regions calling on them to take measures for the participation of communists in supporting the State Emergency Committee. But the party, and most of the first secretaries in particular, had long been demoralized, and it was impossible to achieve anything with encryption alone. Of course, radio and television should have been used to their full potential. However, instead of the necessary ideological and organizational work, radio and television are used to endlessly broadcast ballet music. The rather vague press conference of the State Emergency Committee, held in the evening, does not bring anything new either. In full accordance with such strange “tactics,” there are no organized protests in support of the State Emergency Committee in the capital.
Yeltsin’s supporters are acting in a completely different way - in an organized and extremely active manner. Thus, the tanks brought to the House of Soviets were immediately surrounded by Yeltsin’s agitators, the best of whom were prostitutes who diligently fed ice cream to young soldiers. Speaker at like this Yeltsin could feel quite comfortable in the tank.
Tuesday, August 20. The State Emergency Committee is inactive. The announcers read out the new Decrees of the State Emergency Committee in deliberately mocking voices. The rest of the time there is ballet music. In contrast to the State Emergency Committee, Yeltsin in his speeches, although deceitful, but extremely intelligibly treats the average person, depicting popular indignation at the “putschists”. Demo-fascist rallies are in full swing. All this has a powerful effect not only on the average person, but, unfortunately, also on... the State Emergency Committee.
Wednesday, August 21st. At 00 o'clock at a meeting of the State Emergency Committee in V. Kryuchkov's office, a collective betrayal of the Motherland is committed. With the exception of O. Shenin and O. Baklanov All(!) those present - Kryuchkov, Plekhanov, Grushko, Varennikov, Achalov, Gromov and a whole group of generals - decide not to storm the House of Soviets, where the fierce enemies of the people led by Yeltsin settled, but to negotiate with them. It is clear that now these could only be negotiations on the surrender of the State Emergency Committee. From 1 a.m. to 5 p.m., troops are withdrawn from Moscow. During the day, GKChPists - Baklanov, Kryuchkov, Tizyakov, Yazov, as well as Ivashko and Lukyanov - race to Gorbachev in Foros - to ask for forgiveness. Following them, the Yeltsinists fly out to the same place, but for a different purpose - Bakatin, Rutskoy, Silaev, Primakov. On the same day, the Prosecutor General of the USSR Trubin initiates criminal cases against members of the State Emergency Committee, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a resolution on the illegality of Gorbachev’s removal from power. Wherein R. Nishanov... will demand the execution of A. Lukyanov.
Thursday, August 22. The plane with Gorbachev, Yeltsinists and Kryuchkov arrives in Moscow. Kryuchkov's arrest at the airport. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council gives its consent to the arrest of members of the State Emergency Committee - deputies of the Supreme Council. The beginning of the arrests of the State Emergency Committee. Dismantling of the monument to F.E. Dzerzhinsky. Creation of a loyalty document from the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee on the invalidity of Shenin’s ciphergram of August 19.
Ten years have passed since the State Emergency Committee attempted to change the Gorbachev-Yeltsin course that was disastrous for the peoples of the USSR, and there are still debates about what the members of the State Emergency Committee were, could they have won, and what were the reasons for their such an inglorious defeat?
Members of the State Emergency Committee are sometimes called “Decembrists of the twentieth century” and, based on this beautiful name, they try to present them as the most advanced people of their time, and their actions in an aura of greatness and heroism. Yes, there are certain similarities between them and the Decembrists. Both of them came from the social elite of their society, both of them challenged the despotic regime, but both of them were so “terribly far from the people” that they did not even try to rely on them, but counted on purely the top coup, and in the end, having received no support either from the people or from the “top” of society, they became confused and surrendered to the mercy of the winner.
But there is also a big difference between the Decembrists and the members of the State Emergency Committee, and not in favor of the latter. The Decembrists were far from the people due to the dominant ideology of their time, their noble origin and upbringing; in their time there was no scientific teaching on the development of society. But their personal merit is that, despite all this, they rose to the level of the most advanced views his era. Therefore, they can be considered truly advanced people of their time. Members of the State Emergency Committee are a different matter. They were far from the people, despite the fact that they came from the people. They received an excellent Soviet education, which means they had every opportunity not only to master the scientific teaching about the development of society, but also to apply it in their life practice. This, however, did not happen.
The Decembrists were not sullied by their active support of reaction. For quite a long time, members of the State Emergency Committee were indifferent to the country’s slide into capitalism through the active introduction of market relations into our economy, which began in 1965. With the coming to power of the ardent anti-communist Gorbachev, they were on his team for a long time and actively supported his policies. Of course, they can say that they haven’t figured it out. But why were thousands and thousands of ordinary communists and non-party members of the State Emergency Committee, who did not have even a small amount of information, able to understand where things were going and begin to fight against the restoration of capitalism, at least since 1989? Why did future members of the State Emergency Committee not only not join the ranks of the communist Resistance at that time, but did not even dare to maintain any connection with it? The answer is in one word: “elite”!
The Decembrists did not occupy senior government positions and did not have the same opportunities to fight the reactionary regime that the members of the State Emergency Committee had. So why did the latter “sleep” for so long, and when they “woke up”, they showed nothing but absolute helplessness?
After their defeat, the Decembrists did not repent before the tsar and five of them proudly ascended the scaffold. And our pseudo-Decembrists? The newspaper “Glasnost Dossier” (No. 2, 1999) published the most shameful repentance of V. Kyuchkov and Marshal D. Yazov from “Matrosskaya Tishina”. There is so much to be found in these letters! What worries for the priceless Mikhail Sergeevich and even for dear Raisa Maksimovna! Marshal Yazov went so crazy as to call himself... a prostitute! And others also wrote... And these are the progressive people of our time!?
They say that the reason for the defeat of the Emergency Committee is the poor organizational skills and lack of will of its members. But they were all very experienced organizers of industry, agriculture, party, administrative and security structures. Could Gorbachev agree, for example, that Yu. Plekhanov be the head of his security, and B. Boldin the head of his apparatus, if they were bad organizers? Why was P. Kryuchkov an excellent organizer of the storming of Amin’s palace in Kabul and an excellent organizer of the operation to collapse the GDR, but suddenly became a poor organizer when it was necessary to arrest Yeltsin and his camarilla? And in general, would these people be able to reach the highest government positions if they were poor organizers and weak-willed people? No, where they were firmly convinced that some specific actions were necessary and useful for them - from a career to solving professional problems - they were both good organizers and strong-willed people.
What particularly difficult demands did life present to them in August 1991 and what special qualities did they lack to defeat the cliques of Gorbachev and Yeltsin? They lacked one most important quality, the one that soon after death I.V. Stalin gradually became increasingly scarce among many of our leaders. Bolshevism was not enough for them.
This was expressed, firstly, in their failure to understand that the viability and progress of socialism can be ensured only under the condition of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the steady overcoming of market relations, and in their failure to understand that the rejection of these most important provisions of scientific communism inevitably leads to the restoration of capitalism. They saw with their own eyes the monstrous results of the transition to a market economy, but they were possessed by the illusion of the possibility of some other kind - a “good market”. They did not have complete confidence that the market is the death of socialism, or confidence in the absolute need to fight against market reforms.
They were full of democratic illusions and, although they saw with their own eyes how actual power in the country was rapidly passing into the hands of the bourgeoisie, they did not understand that this was a consequence of the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat imposed even under Khrushchev, that the path of the so-called democratic reforms of M. Gorbachev inevitably leads to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
All these illusions were reflected in the loud, but very abstract, and therefore ineffective Address of the State Emergency Committee to the people: “...A mortal danger looms over our great Motherland... Started on the initiative of M.S. Gorbachev’s policy of reforms, conceived as a means of ensuring the dynamic development of the country and democratization of public life, for various reasons reached a dead end...” But who brought this mortal danger? Who is the enemy? What “various reasons” for the “failure of reforms” are we talking about? There is no answer, because before us is a sweet lie of people who either did not understand or were afraid to say that the “reforms” have not reached a dead end at all, on the contrary, they are successfully fulfilling their purpose, carrying out a well-planned restoration of capitalism.
“...The crisis of power has had a catastrophic impact on the economy,” the Appeal says. - The chaotic, spontaneous slide toward the market caused an explosion of selfishness..." Lies again! It was not the crisis of power that affected the economy, but the government deliberately gave the economy into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which, having acquired the necessary strength, began to seize power. It is also a lie that the cause of the troubles is supposedly a chaotic, spontaneous slide towards the market. It turns out that the market is normal, but we had to crawl towards it somehow differently!
At the end of the Address it was said: “We call on all citizens of the Soviet Union to realize their duty to the Motherland and provide full support to the State Emergency Committee and efforts to bring the country out of the crisis.” Realized! But how to provide this support!? Listen to "Swan Lake"? What efforts, what actions did the State Emergency Committee need to support? After all, the State Emergency Committee was completely inactive! Specific directives were needed. There weren't any. The State Emergency Committee did not dare to call on workers to strike, did not dare to organize even a Moscow-wide rally to counter the orgy of the Yeltsinists. Everyone could see Yeltsin, Rutsky, Silaev and others at the House of Soviets. But where and why were the members of the State Emergency Committee hiding? Why wasn't Yeltsin arrested? This is where we had to start. Why didn't the troops cordon off the House of Soviets? Who was supposed to do all this? Grandmothers with umbrellas? A good call: “Provide all possible support”! In form it is correct, in essence it is a mockery.
The complete lack of Bolshevik qualities among the members of the State Emergency Committee and the complete defeat of their consciousness by democratic idiocy were expressed in their hopes for the possibility of victory over the bourgeoisie through negotiations, in the lack of understanding that the bourgeoisie would never give up power and property without a fight. They saw how easily the bourgeoisie took power. But they had to understand that the bourgeoisie relies on the power of money, and therefore has the ability to bribe the media and recruit mercenaries, while the working people can only take power through the most difficult power struggle.
Therefore, calling on the Soviet people to “provide full support to the State Emergency Committee,” the latter had to take all necessary measures to coordinate their actions and make full use of the power structures that were at its disposal. At the same time, members of the State Emergency Committee should not have considered that it was enough for them, precious ones, to get away with abstract calls and watch from their offices how unarmed people provide them with “full support.” They had to personally lead the uprising, they had to take upon themselves the solution of all the main and most dangerous tasks of the struggle.
Unfortunately, there was none of this. And this once again emphasizes the inappropriateness of comparing members of the State Emergency Committee with the Decembrists, who at least were not afraid to go to Senate Square. Don’t we know how fearlessly the Bolsheviks acted during the Revolution and Civil War!? Is it possible to imagine Stalin or Dzerzhinsky, who, say, having been captured by the Provisional Government, would write tearful letters to Kerensky? But these were the Bolsheviks! These were people absolutely confident in the rightness of their cause and ready to give their lives for its victory. These were truly the best people of their time. The members of the Emergency Committee were just the best people from Gorbachev’s entourage. They were not capable of heroic deeds for the sake of the victory of socialism simply because, in essence, they did not even really know what it was. There was not an ounce of Bolshevism in them, and that decided everything.
From the above, many important conclusions can be drawn. But the most important conclusion, in our opinion, should be that in the upcoming struggle for socialism we need to be extremely vigilant towards those representatives of the former Soviet “elite” who first, in one way or another, fit into the conditions dictated by capitalism, and now , sensing its imminent collapse, they are rushing or have already broken through into the leadership of the communist movement. Often these are highly experienced, intelligent people who are capable of benefiting the movement at some stage, but even these excellent qualities are by no means sufficient to lead the struggle for socialism. The main and decisive quality in this most difficult matter is Bolshevism. But Bolshevism and elitism are incompatible concepts.
Some time will pass and the great work of a real, victorious Revolution will certainly be accomplished. This Revolution will be real and victorious because it will be carried out not by the “elite”, but by the millions of working people. But the great sacrifices made in the name of a decent life for the people may be in vain if the “elite” creeping towards power again creeps into power today. Let us remember this, comrades!
There is another year in the history of the Russian state that can be called revolutionary. When the country became tense to the limit, and Mikhail Gorbachev could no longer influence even his immediate circle, and they tried in every possible way to resolve the current situation in the state by force, and the people themselves chose who to give their sympathies to, the 1991 putsch occurred.
Old leaders of the state
Many leaders of the CPSU, who remained committed to conservative management methods, realized that the development of perestroika was gradually leading to the loss of their power, but they still remained strong enough to prevent the market reform of the Russian economy. By doing this they tried to prevent the economic crisis.
And yet, these leaders were no longer authoritative enough to use persuasion to hinder the democratic movement. Therefore, the only way out of the current situation, which seemed most possible for them, was to declare a state of emergency. No one then expected that in connection with these events the coup of 1991 would begin.
The ambiguous position of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, or the removal of leadership
Some conservative figures even tried to put pressure on Mikhail Gorbachev, who had to maneuver between the old leadership and representatives of the democratic forces in his inner circle. These are Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. This unstable position of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev led to him gradually losing support from both sides. And soon information about the upcoming coup began to leak into the press.
From April to July, Mikhail Gorbachev prepared an agreement, called “Novo-Ogarevo”, with the help of which he was going to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union. He intended to transfer the bulk of the powers to the authorities of the union republics. On July 29, Mikhail Sergeevich met with Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin. The main parts of the agreement were discussed in detail, as well as the upcoming removal of many conservative leaders from their posts. And this became known to the KGB. Thus, events were increasingly approaching the period that in the history of the Russian state began to be called the “August 1991 putsch.”
Conspirators and their demands
Naturally, the leadership of the CPSU was concerned about the decisions of Mikhail Sergeevich. And during his vacation, she decided to take advantage of the situation using force. Many famous personalities took part in this peculiar conspiracy. It was who at that time was the chairman of the KGB, Gennady Ivanovich Yanaev, Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov, Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, Boris Karlovich Pugo and many others who organized the 1991 putsch.
On August 18, the State Emergency Committee sent a group representing the interests of the conspirators to Mikhail Sergeevich, who was vacationing in Crimea. And they presented him with their demands: to declare a state of emergency in the state. And when Mikhail Gorbachev refused, they surrounded his residence and cut off all types of communications.
Provisional Government, or Expectations Not Met
In the early morning of August 19, about 800 armored vehicles were brought into the Russian capital, accompanied by an army of 4 thousand people. It was announced in all the media that the State Emergency Committee had been created, and all powers to govern the country were transferred to it. On this day, waking up people who turned on their TVs could only see an endless broadcast of the famous ballet called “Swan Lake”. This was the morning when the August 1991 coup began.
The people responsible for the conspiracy claimed that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was seriously ill and temporarily unable to govern the state, and therefore his powers were transferred to Yanaev, who was vice president. They hoped that the people, already tired of perestroika, would side with the new government, but the press conference they organized, where Gennady Yanaev spoke, did not make the right impression.
Yeltsin and his supporters
A photograph of Boris Nikolaevich, taken at the time of his speech to people, was published in many newspapers, even in Western countries. Several officials agreed with Boris Yeltsin's opinion and fully supported his position.
Putsch 1991. Briefly about the events that occurred on August 20 in Moscow
A huge number of Muscovites took to the streets on August 20. They all demanded the dissolution of the State Emergency Committee. The White House, where Boris Nikolaevich and his supporters were, was surrounded by defenders (or, as they were called, those resisting the putschists). They built barricades and surrounded the building, not wanting the old order to return.
Among them were a lot of native Muscovites and almost the entire elite of the intelligentsia. Even the famous Mstislav Rostropovich specially flew from the United States to support his compatriots. The August 1991 putsch, the reasons for which was the reluctance of the conservative leadership to voluntarily give up their powers, rallied a huge number of people. Most countries supported those who defended the White House. And all the leading television companies broadcast the events taking place abroad.
Plot failure and the return of the President
A demonstration of such mass disobedience prompted the putschists to decide to storm the White House, which they scheduled for three in the morning. This terrible event resulted in more than one victim. But overall the putsch failed. Generals, soldiers and even most Alpha fighters refused to shoot at ordinary citizens. The conspirators were arrested, and the President returned safely to the capital, canceling absolutely all orders of the State Emergency Committee. This is how the August 1991 coup ended.
But these few days greatly changed not only the capital, but the whole country. Thanks to these events, it occurred in the history of many states. ceased to exist, and the political forces of the state changed their alignment. As soon as the 1991 putsch ended, on August 22, rallies representing the country's democratic movement were held again in Moscow. On them, people carried banners of the new tricolor national flag. Boris Nikolayevich asked the relatives of all those killed during the White House siege for forgiveness, since he could not prevent these tragic events. But overall the festive atmosphere remained.
Reasons for the failure of the coup, or the final collapse of communist power
The 1991 coup ended. The reasons that led to its failure are quite obvious. First of all, the majority of people living in the Russian state no longer wanted to return to the times of stagnation. Distrust in the CPSU began to be expressed very strongly. Other reasons are the indecisive actions of the conspirators themselves. And, on the contrary, quite aggressive on the part of the democratic forces, which were represented by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who received support not only from the large masses of the Russian people, but also from Western countries.
The 1991 coup not only had tragic consequences, but also brought significant changes to the country. He made it impossible to preserve the Soviet Union, and also prevented the further expansion of the power of the CPSU. Thanks to the decree signed by Boris Nikolayevich on the suspension of its activities, after some time all Komsomol and communist organizations throughout the state were dissolved. And on November 6, another decree finally banned the activities of the CPSU.
Consequences of the tragic August coup
The conspirators, or representatives of the State Emergency Committee, as well as those who actively supported their positions, were immediately arrested. Some of them committed suicide during the investigation. The 1991 coup took the lives of several ordinary citizens who defended the White House building. These people were awarded titles and their names forever entered the history of the Russian state. These are Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky and Vladimir Usov - representatives of Moscow youth who stood in the way of moving armored vehicles.
The events of that period forever erased the era of communist rule in the country. The collapse of the Soviet Union became obvious, and the main public masses fully supported the positions of the democratic forces. The putsch had such an impact on the state. August 1991 can safely be considered the moment that sharply turned the history of the Russian state in a completely different direction. It was during this period that the dictatorship was overthrown by the masses, and the choice of the majority was on the side of democracy and freedom. Russia has entered a new period of its development.
The country was flying into the abyss, and the people who could hold it ignored the military oath
For more than a quarter of a century after the events in August 1991, many books and articles were written, many television materials were created, and a large number of debates took place on the radio dedicated to the short history of the existence of the State Emergency Committee.
On the one hand, those in power with amazing persistence continue to repeat the false templates of Yeltsin’s propaganda, born 27 years ago.
On the other hand, despite the fact that most people have long realized the falsity of these writings, they come to the conclusion: many of the circumstances of those days are still shrouded in mystery.
The desire to reveal the truth of the dramatic events that led to the collapse of the USSR and socialism is evidenced by the abundant literature on the history of the State Emergency Committee, which continues to grow every year.
Books and articles published in printing and distributed on the Internet find their many readers who continue to wonder: “Why were the leaders of the government and all law enforcement agencies unable to realize the goals proclaimed by them in the “Address to the Soviet people of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR” dated August 18, 1991, and stop the process of the country’s collapse and the liquidation of the socialist system?”
The Myth of the Coup
Such thoughts do not arise in the minds of those who mindlessly repeat the official explanation of the August 1991 events: “Then a putsch occurred,” that is, there was a rebellion of a small group of adventurers, doomed to failure in advance.
Those who studied modern history in Soviet times could remember this short German word in connection with two events that happened in Germany in the 20s of the twentieth century.
Almost a hundred years ago, putsch was the name given to the attempt at a coup d'etat in Germany, undertaken on March 10, 1920 by landowner W. Kapp, as well as generals Ludendorff, Luttwitz, Seeckt and others.
Relying on the paramilitary "volunteer corps" and units of the Reichswehr, the putschists captured Berlin. The German government fled to Stuttgart.
In response, a general strike of 12 million German workers began. The 100,000-strong German Red Army created these days gave armed resistance to the putschists. Five days later, the Kapp Putsch was defeated.
The history books also mentioned the “beer hall putsch” of the leader of the Nazi Party Hitler and General Ludendorff.
On November 8, 1923, in a Munich beer hall, Hitler announced the overthrow of the governments of Bavaria and all of Germany, as well as the creation of a provisional government of the Reich.
However, the Munich police began shooting at the rioters when they moved from the beer hall to the center of the Bavarian capital, where government offices were located.
Some putschists were killed, others, including Goering, were wounded, and others, including Hitler and Ludendorff, were arrested.
First of all, the word “putsch” to describe the events of August 19–21, 1991 was used in order to equate the creation and activities of the State Emergency Committee with attempts at unsuccessful fascist coups.
The constant use of this term helps to consolidate in the public consciousness the idea of identity between communism and fascism, fabricated in the West.
Its blatant falsity is once again refuted when comparing the State Emergency Committee with the juntas that were created during the fascist uprisings.
Unlike the organizers of the above-mentioned putschs, the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), in its appeal transmitted on August 19, 1991, did not announce the overthrow of the then existing Soviet government.
On the contrary, the State Emergency Committee defended the Soviet system and announced its intention to liquidate institutions created over the past couple of years contrary to the Constitution of the USSR.
The troops sent to Moscow did not storm government buildings, but protected them from possible attempted attacks. Members of the State Emergency Committee did not seize power because they occupied senior government positions.
The State Emergency Committee included Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister of the USSR V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Pugo, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov and others.
The State Emergency Committee became the highest authority in the country, similar to the State Defense Committee of the USSR, created on June 30, 1941.
Then it never occurred to anyone to accuse the members of the State Defense Committee of the coup and call them putschists.
However, unlike the events of 1941, when the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party I.V. Stalin, half a century later, President of the USSR, General Secretary of the Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev did not head the State Committee, which had similar powers.
At the same time, as former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. repeatedly recalled. Lukyanov, the plan to create the State Emergency Committee was first discussed at a meeting with Gorbachev in March 1991.
According to him, this committee was created by Gorbachev on March 8, 1991, and he also determined its composition: “Then the State Emergency Committee under the leadership of Yanaev included all those whom we saw on TV in August 1991. Leaving for Crimea, Gorbachev left Yanaev in his place as acting.”
This would be similar to if Stalin had refused to head the State Defense Committee and appointed his first deputy V.M. as chairman. Molotov.
However, unlike Gorbachev, Stalin did not shirk responsibility; he thought about state interests, and not about how he would look in the eyes of the “world community.”
Gorbachev chose to remain behind the scenes while members of the State Emergency Committee brought order to the country destroyed as a result of his vicious leadership.
Therefore, when members of the Emergency Committee arrived to him in Foros on August 18 with a proposal to declare a state of emergency in order to prevent the adoption of the Union Treaty, which would lead to the actual liquidation of the USSR, Gorbachev told them: “Act.” But he himself removed himself from doing business.
Although modern school textbooks claim that members of the State Emergency Committee declared that “M.S. Gorbachev is temporarily removed from power,” these words cannot be found in any of the documents of the State Emergency Committee.
True, to explain Gorbachev’s absence from the State Emergency Committee, its members announced the illness of the General Secretary.
However, already at a press conference on August 19, Yanaev firmly said that members of the State Emergency Committee intend to continue to work together with Gorbachev.
Counter-revolutionary rebellion against the constitutional order
Accusations of the organizers of the State Emergency Committee of organizing a putsch came from members of the leadership of the RSFSR, led by B.N. Yeltsin, who acted according to the old principle, when the one who stole shouts loudest: “Stop the thief!”
Even before the creation of the State Emergency Committee, the Yeltsin government adopted a number of unconstitutional decrees prohibiting the application of union laws without the consent of the authorities of the RSFSR.
The statements of the Yeltsin government after the creation of the State Emergency Committee were just as illegal.
Since the government of the RSFSR was directly subordinate to the government of the USSR, refusal to recognize the creation of the State Emergency Committee and carry out its orders was a rebellion against the legitimate all-Union government.
For a similar reason, the southern states that declared secession from the United States in 1861 were declared in rebellion by the legitimate government of Abraham Lincoln.
However, if the rebellion of the southern slave-holding states led to the split of the United States into two parts, then Yeltsin’s rebellion provoked the collapse of the USSR into several state entities and led to the liquidation of a great power.
But above all, Yeltsin’s rebellion represented the culmination of counter-revolutionary efforts to restore capitalism in our country, which grew with every year of Gorbachev’s perestroika.
It is no coincidence that Yeltsin’s supporters, at a demonstration of brokers led by Borov, representing the rapidly emerging bourgeoisie of Russia, walked through the Moscow streets with a giant tricolor, as if announcing the resumption of the civil war against the Land of the Soviets.
Yeltsin's counter-revolutionary rebellion was supported by the shadow bourgeoisie of other republics of the USSR, emerging from underground, and by the leaders of the largest Western powers.
In Moscow, tens of thousands of residents of the capital came out in support of the rebellion, who came to the walls of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR on the morning of August 19.
According to the then USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, about 70 thousand Muscovites gathered there, which was less than 1% of the then population of the capital. Nowhere else in Moscow or other cities of the Union were such meetings held in those days.
Later I learned that among those gathered were my acquaintances from the school where I studied and the academic institute where I worked.
Although quite good, if not excellent, specialists in their fields, they, like some intellectuals in the capital at that time, did not have sufficiently deep knowledge on many of the most important issues of social development.
However, for many years they compensated for their ignorance by voraciously devouring sensational rumors and false material from foreign radio voices.
During the years of Gorbachev's perestroika, they became regular consumers of anti-Soviet propaganda, disseminated in fiction novels, films, journalistic articles and television materials, where an attack was launched on the past and present of our country, the idea that Soviet society had reached a dead end was persistently imposed.
Under the influence of this propaganda, the participants in the gathering at the walls of the Supreme Council, long before August 19, formed as enemies of the existing system.
It is not surprising that they joined the ranks of the rebels and began to build barricades.
People who still considered themselves intellectuals decorated the walls of nearby buildings with obscene inscriptions with curses addressed to members of the State Emergency Committee.
This was greatly facilitated by their consumption of alcohol, which was distributed free of charge by the owners of the newly established cooperatives.
Some Moscow intellectuals tried to portray the participants in the uprising as they imagined it from Soviet historical and revolutionary plays and films.
In the book “How Gorbachev “broke into power,” Valery Legostaev described his impressions of a walk through the center of Moscow on August 20: “On the corner of Gorky Street, near the underground passage, there is a tank.
It shows a young man about 30 years old, overweight, waving a striped flag...
From time to time he shouts: “Gorbachev, Yeltsin - yes!” Military coup - no!”
A crowd of about 10 people nearby picks up this slogan.” Legostaev also remembered a woman of about 40–45 years old who swoops down on a tired soldier like a kite and shouts in his face: “Are you going to shoot at mothers?
Are you going to shoot mothers?!”
That same evening I was on Teatralnaya Square and saw a similar “lady” who, standing near the tank, shouted similar lines from an old-fashioned theater performance.
The soldiers on the tank, as well as the rest of the people in the square, looked at the woman as if she were crazy.
At that time, none of the unwitting spectators of these amateur mini-performances could imagine that their performers would soon receive medals for their services to the struggle for democracy and would be called “Defenders of the White House.”
The myth of the “people's revolution”
In his book “The Rebellion against Yeltsin. Team to Save the USSR" Vladimir Isakov, who at that time was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, captured how and by whom the legend of nationwide resistance to the "putsch" was created.
In his diary he wrote: “The internal radio broadcasts around the clock...
There is a continuous stream of comments, interviews, summaries of the latest events, and famous artists perform in front of the White House defenders.
Before our eyes, the image of a GREAT EVENT materializes, is cast in bronze with gilding, and is replicated in millions of copies.”
To complete the majestic picture, an armed clash between the “heroes of democracy” and the “putschists” was not enough.
This deficiency was supplemented by the clash that occurred the next day, August 21, on the Garden Ring between the crew of an armored personnel carrier and three young men with bottles containing a Molotov cocktail.
Through the efforts of the media, this event was turned into a heroic battle.
And although the armored personnel carrier was moving in the opposite direction from the building of the Supreme Council, it was argued that the young people who died during this skirmish stopped the assault on the Russian parliament.
The exaltation of the EVENT AND ITS HEROES continued in the following days. On August 31, 1991, the Rossiya newspaper was choked with delight: “Today, all of us, Russians, are, as it were, at one of the peaks of the mountain system of history. Totalitarianism, the empire, and forcibly implanted Idols are collapsing.
At a new stage, there is a return to the path of development that excludes violence against nature, into the bosom of civilized states.”
The famous publicist A. Bovin, who soon became ambassador to Israel, wrote in Izvestia in those days about the “people's revolution.” Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, writer A. Adamovich called for declaring the events of August 19–22 “a revolution with a smile of Rostropovich,” since a photo of a smiling cellist with a machine gun in his hands near the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR was widely circulated in the media.
The fact that efforts to create a heroic myth about the victory of the popular uprising against the State Emergency Committee were crowned with success is evidenced by its consolidation in the curricula of Russian schools.
School history textbook for 11th grade, written by N.V. Zagladin, S.I. Kozlenko, S. T. Minaev, Yu.A. Petrov, broadcasts: “The society did not support the policy of the State Emergency Committee. Thousands of Muscovites rose up to defend the government and parliament of Russia, which did not recognize the power of the putschists, and surrounded their residence, the White House, with a living ring.”
Dive into the swamp
In fact, in addition to those who stood near the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, in those days there were many more people who held different views.
Gennady Yanaev recalled in his book “GKChP against Gorbachev. The last battle for the USSR": " On the first day of the state of emergency declared in the USSR, out of every thousand telegrams I received in the Kremlin, 700–800 were in support of the State Emergency Committee.” True, Yanaev admitted that the ratio between telegrams of approval and messages condemning the State Emergency Committee on August 20 was already “fifty-fifty.”».
Such swings in mood were explained by deep contradictions in the public consciousness of the Soviet people. Data from sociological surveys, which were announced by V. Kryuchkov and then cited in his book “August 1991.
Where was the KGB? Oleg Khlobustov, testified to the split of Soviet society into three groups:
"ABOUT 5 to 10 percent of the population actively expressed a negative attitude towards the Union and the socialist social system».
Second group (up to 15 - 20 percent) " firmly advocated for the preservation of the Union, for the socialist choice... The bulk of the population - up to 70 percent - behaved indifferently, passively, hoping that decisions that would meet their interests would be developed and accepted by someone other than their interested participation».
Khlobustov noted: “The participants in this “undecided” swamp were situationally oriented, that is, they could support first one side or the other on certain issues».
Contrary to the false information now disseminated in school textbooks, “the defenders of the “White House” did not represent the entire society, but at most 5–10 percent of the country’s population, who were conscious enemies of socialism and the Soviet system.
At the same time, it is possible that a significant part of the telegrams that went to Yanaev in the Kremlin were sent from the “swamp”.
Those who were supposed to show firmness and determination also plunged into the unsteady swamp. A former employee of the Central Committee apparatus, Valery Legostaev, recalled: on the morning of August 19, there was a rumor that the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Oleg Shenin had sent an encrypted message to the localities with instructions to support the State Emergency Committee.
Later this rumor was confirmed.
However, “in the afternoon, Ivashko came to the Central Committee from Barvikha, pushed aside Shenin and took control of the control. It immediately became quiet, like in the children's game “freeze.”
Nobody could really explain anything.”
Since V.A. Ivashko was the first deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he had to follow Gorbachev’s instructions. However, he had no such instructions.
Ivashko forbade the transmission of encryption, but verbally advocated support for the State Emergency Committee.
The position of non-intervention taken by Gorbachev and a number of other leading figures of the Party Central Committee paralyzed the main political force of the country, capable of mobilizing the most active part of the Soviet people to repel the counter-revolution.
Recalling the situation in the Central Committee apparatus, Legostaev wrote:
« Only rumors swarmed around. A feeling arose in my soul and began to grow that we were all in a trap from which there was no way out. On Tuesday, August 20, there was no one in the corridors of the Organizational Department. Everyone sat in their offices like mice. Sometimes one of my colleagues would drop by, leave a rumor and disappear».
Meanwhile, the actions of the State Emergency Committee, according to Yanaev, “were subject to the vicious logic of demonstrative confrontation with the Yeltsin authorities.
A senseless struggle of decrees and resolutions began: we issue - they cancel, they issue - we cancel.
This “tug of war” took up precious time, which, as they say, did not work for us.
Why did everything turn out this way?
Probably, first of all, because we, members of the State Emergency Committee, found ourselves in such “abnormal” conditions for the first time and were too poorly prepared for them.
And this weakness, half-heartedness in decision-making, which Soviet society undoubtedly expected, could not but affect its mood in the August days of 1991.”
Those who betrayed their oath
It was impossible to crush Yeltsin’s rebellion with decrees, and the Emergency Committee developed decisive measures in advance to suppress it. However, their implementation was thwarted by those who stabbed supporters of the preservation of the Union in the back.
From the book “Leonid Shebarshin,” in which Anatoly Zhitnukhin presented a comprehensive portrait of this talented intelligence officer, it becomes clear that the leading executors of the State Emergency Committee's decisions sabotaged them from the first hours of its existence.
Zhitnukhin writes:
« Already on August 19, at a meeting of the intelligence leadership, on the initiative of Shebarshin, it was decided not to take measures to implement the instructions of the KGB chairman in connection with the introduction of a state of emergency and the decisions taken by the State Emergency Committee, but to limit ourselves only to informing foreign apparatus and intelligence officers about the events that had taken place in the country. Instructions were given to send only information about the negative reaction of government circles to the Analytical Department of the KGB and the State Emergency Committee and the public of foreign countries on events in the USSR».
Explaining the reasons that leading KGB officer Shebarshin took the path of sabotage, Zhitnukhin wrote about his long-standing disagreements with KGB chairman Kryuchkov.
These disagreements were caused by Shebarshin's hostility towards the Communist Party, its policies and theories. Zhitnukhin writes:
In addition, as Zhitnukhin notes, “Shebarshin’s line of isolating intelligence from other departments and divisions of the KGB, accompanied by his frequent discussions about the elitism and corporate characteristics of intelligence, was too obvious.
Behind this point of view, the leadership of the KGB and many heads of other departments saw not only some snobbery, but also a desire to remove only intelligence from the sweeping criticism of the “democrats” and declare its non-involvement in the repressions of the 1930s.”
It turns out that, blinded by his high professionalism, Shebarshin put himself and the interests of his colleagues above state considerations and official duty.
Taking a course to sabotage the actions of the State Emergency Committee, “Shebarshin forbade Colonel B.P. Beskov, the commander of the Vympel group, is to participate in the planned actions of the State Emergency Committee, which include, in particular, the arrest of Yeltsin.”
The logic of Shebarshin’s actions, who in the past boldly carried out responsible and risky government tasks, brought him into the camp of the enemies of the USSR.
Zhitnukhin admits:
« Shebarshin in those days took the side of Yeltsin’s entourage. At the critical moment of the confrontation, he was with G.E. Burbulis, Yeltsin's closest ally, and consulted with him. It was from Burbulis’s office that Shebarshin, as he writes in his memoirs, called Kryuchkov and began to dissuade him from any decisive action
. At the same time, he believed that a civil war might break out. But it looked rather naive - there were no prerequisites in the country for this O".
Shebarshin was not alone in his subversive activities. Zhitnukhin writes:
« Following this, the same decision was made by the commander of the Alpha group, Major General V.F. Karpukhin. Both heads of special forces just before the start of the special operation “Thunder” to seize the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in the office of the first deputy chairman of the KGB G.E. Ageeva refused to participate in it...
The developers of Operation Thunder, scheduled for three o'clock in the morning on August 21, understood perfectly well that neither tank regiments nor airborne battalions were needed to implement it - it was assumed that army units and units of internal troops would only block the Supreme Council.
Two elite teams - the groups of Karpukhin and Beskov - could easily cope with the main task. Karpukhin and many other experts shared this opinion the day before.
Later, during interrogation, the head of the Alpha group department, A. Savelyev, also expressed a similar point of view: “As a professional, I will say that in technical terms, the storming of the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR was not particularly difficult, our people were well prepared and could complete the task».
Not only some KGB officers took part in actions against the State Emergency Committee. Zhitnukhin writes:
« Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR V.A. Achalov convinced his minister D.T. Yazov to cancel the participation of military units in Operation Thunder.
The then first deputy minister of internal affairs, V.V. Gromov told Minister B.K. Pugo that the internal troops will not carry out his orders».
The simultaneous refusal of leading figures in the security forces to carry out the orders of their superiors means that the motives that Zhitnukhin revealed to explain Shebarshin’s behavior are unlikely to be fully applicable to interpreting the behavior of other saboteurs.
They were unlikely to share Shebarshin’s thoughts about the elitism of foreign intelligence officers.
At the same time, it is possible that some of the reasons for the reluctance of Gromov, Achalov, Shebarshin and others to carry out the orders of their superiors were similar.
Perhaps they were terrorized by mass propaganda, which constantly spoke about “Stalinism” and the inadmissibility of its repetition.
In his book, Oleg Khlobustov told how in 1989 he “had the opportunity to take part in conducting a content analysis of a number of publications of central and regional publications - about 900 articles in total - on the issues of covering the activities of state security agencies at various stages of their existence.”
According to O. Khlobustov, “about 70% of the analyzed publications had a clearly negative, “exposing” character regarding the activities of state security agencies, and they mainly concerned the period 1930–1950.
But the “conclusions” were extrapolated to the activities of the KGB of the USSR. 20% were “neutral” publications and about 10% were “positive” materials about the modern activities of the KGB bodies.” Khlobustov admitted that “the latter, as a rule, were prepared with the participation of public relations units of the KGB of the USSR.”
Law enforcement officers realized that if they participated in the dispersal of “popular” protests and arrests, they would immediately be declared continuators of “Stalinist repressions.”
From Zhitnukhin’s words it follows that Shebarshin was afraid of this, who tried to separate foreign intelligence from the activities of Soviet counterintelligence, especially in the 1930s. Perhaps they were afraid of being labeled “neo-Stalinists”
Gromov, Achalov and others.
The fact that these fears were not groundless was evidenced by the events that followed the arrests of members of the State Emergency Committee.
They were accused of intending to unleash monstrous mass repressions.
A lie was spread on radio and television that the State Emergency Committee allegedly ordered a certain factory to produce a million handcuffs. Hysterical calls from a number of deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for reprisals against members of the State Emergency Committee and their “accomplices” (and these speeches were broadcast live on radio and television), wild pogroms in the premises of the CPSU Central Committee, the overthrow of the monument to F.E. Dzerzhinsky and many other events at the end of August showed the extent of the anti-Soviet psychopathic epidemic.
The fear of becoming its victims made many people forget what the price of their inaction would be.
But they had already witnessed the bloody events in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, they already knew about the uncontrolled growth of criminal business, lawlessness and crime.
They could easily guess what awaited the country if measures, even severe ones, were not taken to save it.
And yet it is obvious that not all law enforcement officers were intimidated by propaganda terror.
At the same time, we do not yet know all the methods of influence that were applied to those who violated the oath. It is possible that they received “offers they could not refuse.”
All the secrets of how and by whom the defeat of the Emergency Committee was prepared have not yet been revealed.
There is still much to be learned about which of the embassies of the Western powers and their intelligence services directed destructive activities against the defenders of the integrity of the USSR.
Zhitnukhin states:
« The country was flying into the abyss, and the people who could hold it ignored the military oath... It was a complete failure».
Sabotage in the leadership of the security forces of the USSR, and not the screams of exalted ladies on the streets of Moscow and the drunken public at the walls of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, paralyzed the activities of the State Emergency Committee.
The defeat of the Emergency Committee meant the victory of the counter-revolutionary separatist rebels not only in Russia.
Soon after the arrest of the members of the State Emergency Committee, many union republics adopted declarations of independence.
The path to Belovezhskaya Pushcha to the complete dismantling of the USSR was opened in August 1991.
Despite the incessant slander against the State Emergency Committee, for more than two decades of life without the USSR and socialism, many of those who were previously stuck in an ideological swamp realized what a disaster the defeat of the last defenders of the USSR turned out to be. Unfortunately, this realization came too late and the price was too high for it.
Yuri Emelyanov
